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Abortion Heading
STOPPING PHILADELPHIA ABORTION PROVIDER KERMIT
GOSNELL AND PREVENTING OTHERS LIKE HIM:
AN OUTCOME THAT BOTH PRO-CHOICERS
AND PRO-LIFERS SHOULD SUPPORT
SAMUEL W. CALHOUN*
I. INTRODUCTION
PHILADELPHIA abortion provider Dr. Kermit Gosnell achieved infamydue to his “grotesque facility,”1 the now-closed Women’s Medical Soci-
ety.  According to the Philadelphia Inquirer, the clinic’s “abysmal conditions
. . . strain[ed] credulity.”2  These conditions resulted in “[a] searing grand
jury report charg[ing] that his filthy [clinic] butchered babies and women
for more than three decades.”3  The uproar caused by Dr. Gosnell’s clinic
provides a rare opportunity for the two sides of the abortion controversy to
come together.  This Article will explain and defend the proposition that
both pro-choicers and pro-lifers should not only applaud that Dr. Gosnell
has been stopped, but should also unite to prevent others like him.
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.  The
author thanks James Cooprider for his very helpful research assistance and the
Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University, for its support.  Thanks
also to Jon Burtard, Stephen Calhoun, Cynthia Gorney, Robert Miller, and Brian
Murchison for their comments on earlier drafts, as well as to those who attended
the presentation of these ideas at Villanova University School of Law, Washington
and Lee University School of Law, and the 2011 Conference of University Faculty
for Life.  Special thanks are due to Penny Pether and Clarke Forsythe for their
willingness to write a response to this piece.
1. Karen Heller, Politics Clouded the Safeguards Against Practices Like Gosnell’s,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 26, 2011, at A2.
2. Id.
3. Id.  Conditions in the clinic were actually “much worse than can be summa-
rized.”  Tara Murtha, Political Homicide, PHILA. WEEKLY, Feb. 2, 2011, at 10.
(1)
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There are several ways to describe this hoped-for outcome.  “Compro-
mise”4 and “bridging the gap”5 are two possibilities.  Another is “common
ground,” the phrase used by the grand jury that investigated Dr. Gosnell:
Let us say right up front that we realize this case will be used
by those on both sides of the abortion debate.  We ourselves
cover a spectrum of personal beliefs about the morality of abor-
tion.  For us as a criminal grand jury, however, the case is not
about that controversy; it is about disregard of the law and dis-
dain for the lives and health of mothers and infants.  We find
common ground in exposing what happened here, and in rec-
ommending measures to prevent anything like this from ever
happening again.6
Although each of the foregoing terms would appropriately describe pro-
choice and pro-life joint condemnation of Dr. Gosnell,7 a different image
is more helpful.  It is obvious that the abortion controversy is a passionate
dispute that is certain to continue.  Sometimes in a conflict, however, the
combatants can turn aside to face a common enemy.  Think of the 1996
4. Although “compromise” might intuitively seem to be the obvious choice,
this word for me engenders skepticism because in the abortion context it has
sometimes been used to describe situations that deviate significantly from a mean-
ingful compromise.  Laurence Tribe, for example, labels the result in Roe v. Wade,
as a compromise. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 78-
79 (1992) (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).  Given that Roe allows
abortion on demand throughout the entire pregnancy, this characterization of the
decision can hardly be taken seriously. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying
text.
5. In October 2010, an abortion conference at Princeton discussed “emerging
opportunities to bridge the abortion divide.”  Registration Information for Open
Hearts, Open Minds and Fair Minded Words: A Conference on Life and Choice in
the Abortion Debate, Princeton University (Oct. 15-16, 2010). Slate columnist Wil-
liam Saletan, in commenting on the Princeton conference, emphasizes the con-
cept of reaching common ground. See William Saletan, Abortion Common Ground: A
Pro-life Agenda; What Pro-lifers Can Learn from the Princeton Abortion Conference, SLATE
(Nov. 16, 2010, 7:59 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/
human_nature/2010/11/abortion_common_ground_a_prolife_agenda.single.
html.
6. Report of the Grand Jury at 1, In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury XXIII,
Misc. NO. 0009901-2008, (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2011).  For William Saletan’s
focus on common ground, see supra note 5.
7. But see Frances Kissling, A Pro-choice Choice: Shift Course or Lose, WASH. POST,
Feb. 20, 2011, at B1.  Kissling, former head of Catholics for Choice, supports sensi-
ble abortion facility regulation, but rejects “compromise” and “finding common
ground” as descriptions of her position:
These shifts I am suggesting are not about compromising or finding com-
mon ground with abortion opponents.  Compromise assumes that there
are two parties prepared to give up something in return for settling an
issue.  Neither opponents nor advocates of legal abortion are willing to
do that.  But, for pro-choice advocates, standing our ground will mean
losing ground entirely.
Id.  For my own misgivings about the word “compromise,” see supra note 4.
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hit movie, Independence Day, in which all the people of the world unite to
fight alien invaders.8  But what would the film have shown had the story
continued to portray events following the aliens’ defeat?  The short-term
allies would almost certainly have returned to their prior status as adversa-
ries.  Similarly, in calling for the two sides to unite in opposing Dr. Gosnell
and preventing others like him, there should be no illusion that the un-
derlying abortion conflict is over or that either side will refrain from reen-
gaging once the common threat has been addressed.9
But what common threat does Dr. Gosnell represent?  According to
the grand jury report,
This case is about a doctor who killed babies and endan-
gered women.  What we mean is that he regularly and illegally
delivered live, viable, babies in the third trimester of preg-
nancy—and then murdered these newborns by severing their spi-
nal cords with scissors.  The medical practice by which he carried
out this business was a filthy fraud in which he overdosed his pa-
tients with dangerous drugs, spread venereal disease among
them with infected instruments, perforated their wombs and
bowels—and, on at least two occasions, caused their deaths.
Over the years, many people came to know that something was
going on here.  But no one put a stop to it.10
This passage emphasizes two aspects of Dr. Gosnell’s common threat to
the pro-choice and pro-life causes: he flagrantly disregarded the safety of
women and he killed born-alive infants.  There is a third component to
the common threat that the grand jury also condemned: Dr. Gosnell regu-
larly performed illegal post-viability abortions.11  This Article will address
each of these topics: (1) endangering women; (2) killing born-alive babies;
and (3) performing illegal post-viability abortions.  The goal is to demon-
strate why pro-choicers and pro-lifers should join forces to stop such
abuses and prevent any future occurrences.
On their face, Dr. Gosnell’s actions are so extreme that it would seem
a simple matter to achieve consensus in opposing them.  The grand jury’s
account demonstrates that it would be virtually impossible to overstate the
horrific conditions inside Dr. Gosnell’s clinic.12  It is hard to imagine any-
8. INDEPENDENCE DAY (Twentieth Century Fox 1996).
9. Thus, one could appropriately say that this Article asks the two sides to be
“cobelligerents” in opposing Dr. Gosnell.  This term “refers to groups who are
sharply opposed on most other issues but who agree to work in tandem on one
particular issue where they agree.” TIMOTHY KELLER, GENEROUS JUSTICE: HOW
GOD’S GRACE MAKES US JUST 216 n.129 (2010).
10. Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 1.
11. See id. at 78-83, 232-35.
12. For a further discussion of the conditions of Dr. Gosnell’s office, see supra
note 10 and accompanying text; infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text; and
infra note 29.
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one who would not want to stop and punish him.13  Nonetheless, it is im-
portant to acknowledge the difficulties faced in asking pro-choicers and
pro-lifers to ally against Dr. Gosnell.  The two sides view the issue of abor-
tion from diametrically opposing perspectives.14  To pro-choicers, the
freedom to choose abortion is an indispensable aspect of a woman’s right
to control her own body.  Moreover, this freedom to choose, following Roe
v. Wade, is now cherished as a vital constitutional right.  To pro-lifers, a
woman who chooses abortion does not simply exercise sovereignty over
her own body, but also takes the life of another human being.  And pro-
lifers view the Roe-declared constitutional freedom as illegitimate, a usur-
pation of the right to democratic self-government on the issue of abortion.
In addition to the combatants’ radically different perspectives, the un-
derlying physical facts of pregnancy make it difficult to compromise on
abortion.  To allow abortion will necessarily destroy fetal life, and to pro-
tect fetal life by prohibiting abortion will necessarily and significantly re-
strict a woman’s freedom.  Thus, it is not surprising that the two sides have
settled into a sullen stand-off and often view each other with suspicion, if
not hostility.
But, despite these difficulties, it should be possible for the two sides to
join forces in condemning Dr. Gosnell.  To encourage this outcome, this
Article poses difficult questions for both pro-choicers and pro-lifers.
There is no guarantee that these hard questions will be answered to every-
one’s satisfaction.  Rather, the hope is that the longtime adversaries will at
least be prompted to reflect upon the real possibility of joint action, not
only in opposing Dr. Gosnell as an individual wrongdoer,15 but also in
speaking with a common voice on three significant issues in the ongoing
abortion controversy.
13. See Heller, supra note 1 (“People on both sides of the abortion debate
should have been outraged by what was happening.  Such atrocities should rise
above ideology, appealing to basic humanity.”).  Heller hoped that Gosnell’s ac-
tions would “shame people into demanding stricter supervision of abortion clin-
ics.” Id.  But a later piece by Heller, in which she comments on two proposals then
before the Pennsylvania legislature, demonstrates the challenge of actually formu-
lating regulations acceptable to all: “These bills are not about protecting women’s
health.  They are about restricting access to a legal procedure.”  Karen Heller,
Abortion-Clinic Bills About an Agenda, Not Health, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 19, 2011, at
A2.
14. Professor Cynthia Gorney states “ ‘the nature of this conflict is like some
terrible puzzle in philosophy class designed to make you crazy.  The essence of
each position negates the possibility of the other.’”  Phyllis Orrick, Pro-fight: The
Uses and Misuses of the Abortion Debate, EXPRESS (OAKLAND), July 17, 1998, at 1, 10.
Although each of the points to follow in the accompanying main text paragraph
could be exhaustively footnoted, the reader is asked to take the equivalent of “judi-
cial notice” respecting these well-known components of the abortion debate.
15. See infra note 23.
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II. ENDANGERING WOMEN
Some of the horrifying consequences of Dr. Gosnell’s actions have
already been mentioned, including the spread of infection and venereal
disease through unsanitary conditions.16  A subheading in the grand jury
report, “Butcher of [W]omen,”17 in itself is a telling description, but addi-
tional quotes from the report more fully convey the grand jury’s outrage.
Gosnell was “a deadly threat to mothers.”18  He “left dozens of damaged
women in his wake.  His reckless treatment left them infected, sterilized,
permanently maimed, close to death, and, in at least two cases, dead.”19
“Every aspect of [his] practice reflected an utter disregard for the health
and safety of his patients, a cruel lack of respect for their dignity, and an
arrogant belief that he could forever get away with the slovenly and care-
less treatment of the women who came to his clinic.”20  “The Women’s
Medical Society stands as a monument to an absolute disdain for the
health and safety of women . . . .”21
How could anyone not be appalled by these descriptions?  Americans
United for Life (AUL) certainly is.  A post on the organization’s website is
entitled “Philadelphia’s ‘House of Horrors’ Abortion Clinic Underscores
Need for Stringent Regulation.”22  And one would certainly expect the
same call for regulation from pro-choicers.23  After all, a principal pro-
choice argument for legalized abortion has always been the contrast be-
tween the back-alley horrors of the illegal abortion era and safe, legal
16. See supra text accompanying note 10.
17. Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 6.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 99.  Dr. Gosnell has been indicted for the murder of Karnamaya
Mongar, who died after receiving “high doses of anesthetic for an illegal late-term
abortion performed in 2009.”  Sabrina Tavernise, Doctor Charged in Deaths of Woman
and 7 Babies in Philadelphia Clinic, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at A15.  The other
woman who died under Dr. Gosnell’s care is Semika Shaw, “who died from an
infection in 2002 after an abortion at the clinic.”  Sabrina Tavernise, Squalid Abor-
tion Clinic Escaped State Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at A25.
20. Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 24.
21. Id. at 23.
22. Denise Burke, Philadelphia’s “House of Horrors” Abortion Clinic Underscores
Need for Stringent Regulation, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.aul.
org/2011/01/philadelphia%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Chouse-of-horrors%E2%80
%9D-abortion-clinic-underscores-need-for-stringent-regulation/.
23. It is important to note that pro-choicers are uniformly appalled by the
reports on Dr. Gosnell’s clinic.  For example, Dayle Steinberg, CEO of Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, states that “Planned Parenthood
strongly condemns the alleged actions of Kermit Gosnell, and we would condemn
any physician or health-care provider who did not follow the law or recklessly en-
dangered the health of others.”  Dayle Steinberg, Women’s Right Facing Threats,
PHILLY.COM SAY WHAT? BLOG (Jan. 23, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.philly.com/
philly/blogs/inq_ed_board/Dayle_Steinberg_Womens_right_facing_threats.html.
Most pro-choicers, however, do not believe that additional regulation is the proper
response.  For Ms. Steinberg’s own position, see infra note 73 and accompanying
text.
5
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abortion.24  Surprisingly, however, although there is some pro-choice sup-
port for government regulation of abortion clinics,25 most pro-choice or-
ganizations have long opposed it.
How can this anomaly be explained?  Meredith Viera reported a story
twenty years ago on 60 Minutes that gives at least part of the answer.26  The
story focused on the Hillview Women’s Medical Surgical Center in Mary-
land.27  Several tragic incidents were described.  Suzanne Logan went
where she assumed she could obtain a safe, legal abortion and came out
almost completely paralyzed and unable to speak.28  Linda Brown almost
bled to death before she was transferred to a hospital, where an emer-
gency hysterectomy was performed.29  Debra Gray’s heart stopped while
under anesthesia and she never woke up.30  Viera discovered that many
pro-choice leaders knew about the problems at Hillview, but did not want
them publicized.31  Most abortion-rights activists refused to speak on cam-
era for the 60 Minutes story, but Barbara Radford, head of the National
Abortion Federation (NAF), eventually did: “ ‘Well, I think your first reac-
tion from us was this is the last thing we need. We had hoped that it wouldn’t
get national publicity because of the political nature of all of this.’”32  Mary
Boergers, a pro-choice state senator in Maryland, reacted differently.  She
strongly advocated abortion clinic regulation:
When we say what we’re trying to do is guarantee safe abortions,
and eliminate back-alley unsafe abortions, and yet you can
demonstrate that there’s a woman who died, and another woman
24. See Heller, supra note 1, at A2 (“Abortion is a legal medical procedure.
The very reason advocates champion its legality, along with proper oversight, is to
avoid exactly the type of back-alley butchery that Gosnell is now charged with
inflicting.”).
25. See supra note 7; infra notes 33, 70, and accompanying text; infra note 35.
26. See 60 Minutes: Suzanne Logan’s Story (CBS television broadcast Apr. 21,
1992); see also Nat Hentoff, Covering Up Destructive Abortions, VILLAGE VOICE, June
18, 1991, at 20.
27. See Hentoff, supra note 26, at 20.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 21.  At least two of Dr. Gosnell’s patients experienced similar
tragedies.  Thirty-eight-year-old Sherry Thomas woke up after her abortion “soaked
in her own blood and feeling scared.  People were moving around her, trying to
put her in an ambulance.  Her uterus had been punctured.  She was rushed to the
hospital, where she was given a partial hysterectomy.”  Tavernise, Squalid Abortion
Clinic, supra note 19, at A25.  Another nineteen-year-old patient “was held for sev-
eral hours after Gosnell punctured her uterus.  As a result of the delay, she fell into
shock from blood loss, and had to undergo a hysterectomy.”  Report of the Grand
Jury, supra note 6, at 6; see id. at 72.
30. See Hentoff, supra note 26, at 21.  Dr. Gosnell’s patient, Karnamaya Mon-
gar, died in the same way. See Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 7-8.  For a
further discussion of the death of Karnamaya Mongar, see supra note 19.
31. See Hentoff, supra note 26, at 21 (explaining that pro-choice leaders at-
tempted to bury the story because of bad publicity it would bring to abortion).
32. Id. at 21.  Ms. Radford not only worried about bad publicity, but also op-
posed increased clinic regulation. See id.
6
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who’s paralyzed, then not only that argument, but all arguments
from the pro-choice community can become suspect.33
Sadly, the Maryland episode is not an isolated occurrence.  William
Saletan of Slate, in reaction to the Gosnell debacle, posted an eight-part
series in February 2011 entitled, The Back Alley: How the Politics of Abortion
Protects Bad Clinics.34  Most of the articles focus on 1989-1990 events in
Florida.  Horrific conditions had been uncovered in several abortion clin-
ics, which prompted efforts by the state to more fully regulate clinics,
which in turn triggered a massive, successful effort by most pro-choice or-
ganizations to thwart the regulations.35  The titles of two of Saletan’s indi-
vidual articles tell the story: (1) The Sisterhood of Silence: A Bad Abortion
Clinic, a Dead Woman, and a Wall of Pro-choice Denial;36 and (2) ‘Leave Well
Enough Alone’: How Pro-choicers Won a Political Victory by Ignoring Bad
Medicine.37
Accounts of pro-choice opposition to clinic regulation in Maryland
and Florida naturally evoke a question: How can pro-choicers, who have
long extolled the safety of legal abortion, possibly oppose state regulation
designed to ensure that abortion clinics are safe in fact?38  One proffered
33. Id. (emphasis omitted).
34. The first article in the series is William Saletan, What Happened to the Wo-
men: A Grand Jury Says Kermit Gosnell Mistreated and Killed Abortion Patients.  Why Did
Nobody Stop Him?, SLATE (Feb. 16, 2011, 5:34 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/the_back_alley/2011/02/what_happened_to_the_women.sin-
gle.html.  Subsequent articles in the series can be accessed through a link found
within the first article.
35. One iteration of the proposed Florida regulations was “quite modest,” re-
quiring only that abortion providers, “[a]s part of their annual license renewal, . . .
submit the names of their doctors to the state Department of Health and Rehabili-
tation Services.  In turn, HRS would have to verify with Florida’s Department of
Professional Regulation that each doctor was licensed.”  William Saletan, Choosing
Sides: The Abortion Clinic Debate that Tore Apart Florida’s Pro-choice Coalition, SLATE
(Feb. 25, 2011, 7:15 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_
back_alley/2011/02/choosing_sides.single.html.  Planned Parenthood’s Florida
affiliates and the Florida Coalition for Choice “endorsed the bill,” but it was op-
posed by the Florida Abortion Rights Action League, Florida NOW, the Florida
ACLU, the Florida Abortion Council, and the Protectors of Women’s Abortion
Rights. See id.  The bill passed the Florida Senate, but not the House. See id.  Pro-
choice state senator Mary Grizzle “was mystified by the opposition.  She feared for
every woman in South Florida who opened the Yellow Pages to find an abortion
clinic.  To her, the issue wasn’t choice; it was safety.” Id.
36. William Saletan, The Sisterhood of Silence: A Bad Abortion Clinic, a Dead Wo-
man, and a Wall of Pro-choice Denial, SLATE (Feb. 18, 2011, 7:47 AM), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_back_alley/2011/02/
the_sisterhood_of_silence.single.html.
37. William Saletan, “Leave Well Enough Alone”: How Pro-choicers Won a Political
Victory by Ignoring Bad Medicine, SLATE (Feb. 23, 2011, 6:39 AM), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/the_back_alley/2011/02/leave_well_enough_
alone.single.html.
38. For a further discussion of how opposition to regulation of abortion prov-
iders runs counter to the pro-choice goal of safe abortion, see supra notes 24, 35,
and accompanying text.
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explanation is that clinic regulation is not actually aimed at protecting
women, but instead has the goal of shutting down abortion clinics.39  Mer-
edith Viera reported in 1991 that pro-choice activists feared that pro-lifers
would use clinic regulation “as a backdoor way to stop abortions.”40  These
fears were still rampant in 2011 Pennsylvania.41  Pro-lifers who support
39. See, e.g., A. Barton Hinkle, Clinic Controls Could Create Converts, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 4, 2011, at A9.  Hinkle sees nothing surprising in this type of
complaint:
Abortion-rights supporters fume that the new rules really have nothing to
do with protecting consumers and are, instead, part of an ideological
campaign to “get” their industry.  The same might be said about other
industries fighting other regulations—e.g., payday lenders.  Many people
also find those operations morally odious and want to regulate them out
of existence as well.  Ditto the production of silicone breast implants, ge-
netically modified crops, factory farming, and so on.  That people with
agendas exploit government power for political ends is not exactly news.
Want to stop them?  Limit government power in the first place.
Id.  For a further discussion of Virginia’s abortion clinic regulations, see infra note
43 and accompanying text.  Hinkle makes an interesting point, but it should be
noted that he offers no evidence that the Virginia regulations were in fact in-
tended to shut down abortion clinics.  He also does not even discuss the merits of
government intervention in each of the situations he mentions.  He simply as-
sumes it would be unwarranted.
40. See Hentoff, supra note 26; 60 Minutes: Suzanne Logan’s Story, supra note 26.
Similarly, William Saletan reports that Charlene Carres, a pro-choice opponent of
abortion clinic regulation in Florida, believed that alleged safety concerns were “a
front for pro-lifers . . . ‘who would like to see abortion made illegal because they
consider it murder.’”  William Saletan, Fighting the Gestapo: Why Good Abortion Prov-
iders Refused to Cooperate with Florida Health Inspectors, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2011, 10:21
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_back_alley/2011/02/
fighting_the_gestapo.single.html.
41. Pro-choice advocates branded one regulatory bill proposed in the wake of
Dr. Gosnell’s indictment a “[t]rojan horse, appearing on its surface to protect wo-
men but instead harboring a teeming horde of regulations and restrictions sup-
ported by anti-abortion and right-wing interests.  The actual aim, these advocates
say, is to shut down the state’s abortion clinics.”  Holly Otterbein, Hiding in Plain
Sight?  Is a Bill That’s Supposed to Protect Women at Abortion Clinics Actually an Anti-
abortion Trojan Horse?, PHILA. CITY PAPER, Apr. 21, 2011.  Pro-choicers likewise criti-
cize Pennsylvania’s new clinic regulation measure as enacted in December 2011.
See Corbett Signs New Abortion Clinic Rules, NBC10 PHILA. Dec. 22, 2011, http://www.
nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Governor-Tom-Corbett-Signs-New-Abortion-
Clinic-Rules-136072498.html.  Although the law’s proponents claim “it will help
protect the health and safety of women seeking an abortion . . . opponents said it is
a back-door attempt to outlaw abortion.” Clinic Operators in Pa. Brace for Tough New
Facility Standards for Performing Abortions, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2011, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/clinic-operators-in-pa-brace-for-tough-new-facility-
standards - for -performing-abortions/2011/12/21/gIQAEZAa9O_story .html. A
Philadelphia Inquirer editorial agrees with the critics: Protecting women “is not the
true motivation behind this legislation.  This bill represents a blatant attempt to
shut down even those abortion clinics that have operated safely and without inci-
dent for years.”  Editorial, New Abortion-Clinic Rules Would Harm Women, PHILLY.COM,
Dec. 16, 2011, http://articles.philly.com/2011-12-16/news/30524905_1_abortion-
clinics-kermit-gosnell-abortion-coverage.  For another example of this particular
pro-choice criticism of what motivates pro-lifers to regulate abortion clinics, see
infra note 110.
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such regulations say “not so.”42  For example, Jill Holtzman Vogel, a Vir-
ginia state senator, states: “ ‘This is not about banning abortion . . . .  It is
simply caring for women who are about to have an invasive surgical proce-
dure.  And creating an environment for them where they have the oppor-
tunity to have that in a place that’s safe.’”43  Similarly, the executive
director of the Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation supports tougher clinic
regulation by referring to “‘the manner in which women were brutalized’”
in Gosnell’s clinic.44  Changes are needed “‘to protect women.’”45
But don’t pro-choicers have reason to question the sincerity of such
statements from pro-lifers?  On reflection, isn’t it odd that a pro-lifer
would want to make abortion clinics safer?  From the pro-life perspective,
the women are killing their innocent, helpless, unborn children.  If one
genuinely believes babies are being killed in clinics, it would make sense
to use whatever legal means possible, including safety regulations,
to shut them down.46  Why would pro-lifers want to make what they con-
42. There are, however, some pro-lifers who admit to using clinic regulations
to limit abortions. See infra note 46, 101.
43. Rosalind S. Helderman, Abortion Clinics in Virginia Will Face New Regula-
tions, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2011, at A1.  Senator Vogel’s statement was made in
reference to a bill, passed by the Virginia General Assembly in February 2011,
which subjected first-trimester abortion clinics that perform at least five proce-
dures a month to the same regulations applicable to outpatient hospitals. See id.
As might be expected, “[a]bortion–rights supporters fume[d] that the new rules
really have nothing to do with protecting consumers and are, instead, part of an
ideological campaign to ‘get’ their industry.”  Hinkle, supra note 39.  According to
Rosemary Codding, director of patient services at a first-trimester abortion clinic,
“‘This has nothing to do with quality care for women . . .  They are denying what
Roe v. Wade said we could do.’”  Helderman, supra.  Regulation opponent Senator
Dick Saslaw was derisive: “ ‘Anyone who thinks this debate was about women’s
health, get a life . . . .’”  Chelyen Davis, Virginia Passes Tougher Abortion Standards,
FREDERICKSBURG.COM, Feb. 24, 2011, http://fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/2011/
022011/02242011/1298578733fls.  For similar contradictory assessments of the
regulations passed to implement this statutory change, see infra note 94.
44. Steven Ertelt, Corbett Fires State Employees After Gosnell Abortion Horrors,
LIFENEWS.COM (Feb. 15, 2011, 4:29 PM), http://www.lifenews.com/2011/02/15/
gov-announces-major-changes-after-gosnell-abortion-horrors/.
45. Id.  Safer clinics would seem inevitably to lead to reduced harm to the
women using them, but this increased safety is not absolutely certain.  If safer clin-
ics lead to more abortions, the overall harm to women could increase—e.g., if
regulations increased the number of abortions by twenty percent, but reduced a
ten percent injury rate to nine percent, the result is more injured women, not
fewer.
46. Some pro-lifers openly articulate this motivation in supporting clinic regu-
lation.  Proponents of a new regulatory scheme in Virginia argued “alternately that
abortion amounts to killing and that the clinics must be more stringently regulated
to ensure safety of the women who use them.”  Jim Nolan, Health Board Adopts
Abortion Clinic Regulations, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 2011, http://
www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2011/sep/15/25/pro-choice-anti-abortion-advo-
cates-address-regulat-ar-1312067/.  One regulation proponent left no question
whatever about her true motivation: “ ‘Just because something is legal, that does
not make it morally right . . .  No person has the right to kill another, especially a
mother killing her child.’”  Anita Kumar, Stricter Va. Rules on Abortion Gain, WASH.
POST, Sept. 16, 2011, at B1 (quoting Frances Bouton).  For other pro-lifers’ appar-
9
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sider to be killing safer for those acquiescing in their own children’s
destruction?47
Pro-lifers might respond to this challenge by reaffirming that the pro-
life movement truly cares about women.  As stated by Victoria Cobb, presi-
dent of the Family Foundation of Virginia, “ ‘The pro-life movement has
multiple goals.  One is to protect unborn life . . .  And the other is protect-
ing and caring for women.’”48  Strong evidence of this concern for women
is the effort expended to provide women with meaningful alternatives to
abortion.49  These alternatives not only save unborn children’s lives but
also prevent the harm that pro-lifers believe abortion inflicts upon
women.50
But caring for women in the effort to prevent abortion differs dramat-
ically from caring for women who are participating in an abortion.  Pro-
lifers, however, believe that women are in an important sense victims of
the legal abortion establishment.  The law victimizes women by not only
making abortion legal, but also by exalting abortion as a constitutional
ent approval of using regulations to shut down clinics, see infra note 101.  Some
pro-choicers have implicitly recognized that this strategy would be expected con-
duct by one with the pro-life perspective. See supra note 40.  Others might think
that a pro-lifer would naturally adopt a completely opposite attitude toward clinic
regulation—oppose any safety rules to keep the procedure unsafe as a deterrent to
a woman’s choosing abortion.  This approach, however, would contradict the sym-
pathy that pro-lifers feel for women as victims of the existing legal abortion regime.
See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
47. An analogy might clarify the point of this paragraph.  Imagine a pro-life
physician who believes that abortion kills a baby.  In addition, the physician knows
of and greatly regrets instances of harm to women from unsafe abortion proce-
dures.  Assume that the physician, being greatly skilled, could perform abortions
more safely than an ordinary abortion provider.  Nonetheless, wouldn’t it be in-
conceivable for the physician to offer abortion services to better protect women?
Admittedly, a pro-lifer who supports clinic regulation is not complicit in the abor-
tion procedure to the degree of a performing physician, but doesn’t support of
clinic regulation at the very least implicitly signal endorsement of what happens
inside?
48. Brigid Schulte, Abortion Providers Wary of New Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 27,
2011, at C1.
49. Two prominent examples are Feminists for Life’s College Outreach Pro-
gram and the nationwide work of hundreds of Crisis Pregnancy Centers. See gener-
ally College Outreach Program, FEMINISTS FOR LIFE, http://www.feministsforlife.org/
cop/brochure.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (describing work of Feminists for
Life’s College Outreach Program); Welcome to Heartbeat!, HEARTBEAT INT’L, http://
www.heartbeatinternational.org/services-about-us/about-us-home (last visited Nov.
6, 2011) (describing work of one particular network of Crisis Pregnancy Centers).
50. This pro-lifer belief has led to such organizations as Rachel’s Vineyard,
the Silent No More Awareness Campaign, and Women Exploited by Abortion. See
CAROL EVERETT & JACK SHAW, BLOOD MONEY 69 (1992); ABBY JOHNSON, UNPLANNED
62, 210, 245 (2010).  For further discussion of the negative effect of abortion upon
women, see THE COST OF “CHOICE”: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION
(Erika Bachiochi ed., 2004).
10
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right.51  The abortion industry victimizes women by hard-selling abortions
with such tactics as withholding information about fetal development52
and other subjects,53 and, even worse, providing false information.54
51. From the pro-life perspective, “victimization” is an accurate concept be-
cause the law encourages abortion and its attendant damage to women.  For a
further explanation, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
52. For example, in 1986, Dr. Sally Faith Dorfman, who co-authored a
Planned Parenthood (PP) critique of the pro-life film, The Silent Scream, spoke at
the annual meeting of the American Public Health Association.  She recom-
mended use of sonography as a way to ascertain fetal age prior to an abortion, but
also during the procedure itself, “both as a teaching tool and as a means of en-
hancing safety.” Warns of Negative Psychological Impact of Sonography in Abortion, OB.
GYN. NEWS, Feb. 15-28, 1986, at 42.  But Dorfman also warned of possible “psycho-
logical hazards.  Seeing a blown-up, moving image of the embryo she is carrying
can be distressing to a woman who is about to undergo an abortion . . . .  [Dorf-
man] stressed that the screen should be turned away from the patient.” Id.; see also
EVERETT & SHAW, supra note 50, at 98 (noting how training in selling abortions
included order to stop showing fetal development information).  Despite Dr. Dorf-
man’s advice, at least one abortion provider—former PP clinic director, Abby
Johnson, who has now become pro-life—did offer women the opportunity to see
an ultrasound photo of the fetus. See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 46, 59.  The abor-
tion industry, however, is opposed to a legal duty that abortion providers show fetal
ultrasounds to women contemplating an abortion.  PP, for example, has filed a
lawsuit challenging a 2011 Texas statute that imposes such a requirement. See
Zach Zagger, Rights Group Asks Judge to Block Texas Abortion Law Requiring Sonogram,
JURIST (July 3, 2011, 12:18 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/07/rights-
group-asks-judge-to-block-texas-abortion-law-requiring-sonogram.php.  A federal
judge has issued a preliminary injunction blocking the law.  Jim Forsyth, Judge
Blocks Parts of Texas Abortion Law on Sonograms, REUTERS, Aug. 30, 2011, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/31/us-abortion-texas-idUS-
TRE77U06F20110831 ; see also Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v.
Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2011 WL 3818879, at *31 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2011)
(placing injunction on Texas ultrasound law), vacated in part, No. 11–50814, 2012
WL 45413 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012).  “Abortion rights advocates [also] oppose laws
that require ultrasounds, even if viewing the images is voluntary.”  Kevin Sack, In
Ultrasound, Abortion Fight Has New Front, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A1.
53. Steven Ertelt, Louisiana: Gov. Jindal Signs Bill to Stop Coerced Abortions,
LIFENEWS.COM (July 6, 2011, 4:24 PM), http://www.lifenews.com/2011/07/06/
louisiana-gov-jindal-signs-bill-to-stop-coerced-abortions/.  PP opposes a recent Lou-
isiana law designed to prevent coerced abortions.  The law requires that abortion
clinics post “signs inform[ing] women that they can’t be forced to abort against
their will, the father is liable for support, adoptive parents may pay costs of prena-
tal care and childbirth, and there are many public and private resources to help
during and after pregnancy.” Id.  Pro-choicers object to such laws for several rea-
sons, pointing out that they, among other things, “discount women’s decision-mak-
ing . . . and interfere with the relationship between women and their health care
providers.” A Year in Review: 2009 Legislative Wrap-Up, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE
RTS. (Feb. 1, 2010), http://reproductiverights.org/en/project/a-year-in-review-
2009-legislative-wrap-up.  These reasons ring hollow in the face of the core pro-
choice commitment to presenting women with genuine choices in dealing with an
unwanted pregnancy.  Moreover, at least in the case of abortion providers like PP,
advocacy decisions no doubt are heavily influenced by marketing considerations
and the desire to profit from performing abortions.  For direct evidence of how
important profit is to PP, see infra note 84.
54. See EVERETT & SHAW, supra note 50, at 133-35 (discussing how abortion
providers profit by falsely telling women they were pregnant).  Abortion providers
11
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Moreover, once a woman in a clinic has decided to proceed with an abor-
tion, the chance to save the fetus’s life has been lost.55  The second-best
outcome is to help ensure that the woman herself is not injured or killed.
She should not be abandoned to her fate at the hands of abortion provid-
ers such as Dr. Gosnell.56  But even if one assumes the genuineness of the
professed pro-life motivation to protect women through abortion clinic
regulation, many pro-choicers still oppose government intervention.  Nu-
merous arguments are made, but most are unpersuasive.
One early pro-choice response to Dr. Gosnell’s arrest was a press re-
lease by the NAF, explaining itself to be “the professional association of
abortion providers in North America . . . [whose] mission is to ensure safe,
legal, and accessible abortion care, which promotes health and justice for
women.”57  The NAF sought to reassure its readers by emphasizing that
Gosnell’s clinic was “an outlier and not typical of the high-quality abortion
care provided by NAF members.”58  In fact, Gosnell was rejected for NAF
also use language that, while not literally false, is so obfuscating as to be seriously
misleading. See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 47 (describing effect of abortion drug,
in PP terminology, as “removing an unwanted pregnancy” rather than “killing a
fetus”).
55. Pro-lifers have been successful in enacting and defending laws to compel
abortion providers to act in ways that could influence women not to abort—e.g.,
observe mandatory waiting periods, provide fetal development information, and
offer the opportunity to view a fetal ultrasound examination.  Such laws are consis-
tent with the principle that a state is allowed “to further its legitimate goal of pro-
tecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a[n]
[abortion] decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State
expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.”  Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (plurality opinion).
56. Pro-choicers will no doubt be quick to point out that the ultimate goal of
the pro-life movement is to prohibit most, if not all, abortions.  If this objective is
ever accomplished, won’t pro-lifers be abandoning those women who still seek
abortions to the illegal abortion market?  What about the safety and health of these
women?  Doesn’t pro-life pursuit of prohibition thus irrefutably demonstrate a lack
of commitment to women’s safety?  This argument might initially seem difficult for
a pro-lifer to answer.  Actually, though, it is not, as long as one does not forget the
broader national context in which Dr. Gosnell acted.  This Article urges pro-
choicers and pro-lifers to come together to support clinic regulation in this pre-
sent era of legal abortion.  Pro-lifers, though, believe that abortion unjustifiably
takes a human life.  Thus, they will naturally keep working to make most abortions
illegal again.  Pro-lifers believe that illegalization will substantially reduce the num-
ber of abortions by signaling society’s disapproval.  Thus, fewer women will be sub-
jected to the risks of the procedure.  But, tragically, some women undoubtedly will
still seek abortions.  Pro-lifers believe that protecting the lives of unborn children
is an important enough goal to warrant this risk to women, which they contend,
will not be that severe anyway. See infra note 88.  Pro-choicers obviously would not
agree, but this difference between the two sides is unavoidable given the clash of
their underlying presuppositions. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
57. Press Release, Vicki Saporta, Pres., Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, Open Letter to
Patients: Despite Recent Headlines, Quality Abortion Care is the Norm (Jan. 21,
2011), available at www.prochoice.org/news/releases/20110121.html.
58. Id.  Dayle Steinberg, president and CEO of Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania, worries that abortion opponents will “ ‘take this really iso-
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss1/1
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-1\VLR101.txt unknown Seq: 13  9-MAY-12 15:06
2012] STOPPING GOSNELL AND PREVENTING OTHERS LIKE HIM 13
membership “because his facility did not meet NAF’s standards for quality
care.”59  The NAF concluded by again contrasting Gosnell’s “one facility”
with the legitimate, safe abortion providers in Pennsylvania.60
The NAF’s implicit argument is that government regulation is not
needed because most abortion providers are competent professionals.61
But the press release itself contradicts this position by noting that NAF
members “care for more than half the women who choose abortion each
year in the United States, Canada, and Mexico City.”62  What about the
remainder of women who go to non-NAF members?63  The very fact that
the NAF imposes “a rigorous application process” for membership, includ-
ing compliance with its “Clinical Policy Guidelines (CPGs), which set the
standards for quality abortion care in North America,” demonstrates that
the organization acknowledges the necessity of specific safety require-
ments.64  Yet, at present, many women lack such safeguards.65  Is the NAF
unconcerned for them?66
lated case and use it as an opportunity to make a case that this is what all abortion
providers are like and how ‘unsafe’ it is.’”  Murtha, supra note 3.
59. Press Release, Open Letter to Patients, supra note 57.
60. Id.
61. See id.  Although this press release did not explicitly refer to governmental
regulation of abortion clinics, the NAF has long been opposed to such measures.
See Hentoff, supra note 26 (describing pro-choice opposition to regulation of abor-
tion clinics).  The argument that abortion is generally a safe procedure was also
made in the 1989-1990 Florida dispute by those opposing regulation.  Charlene
Carres, a lobbyist for the Protectors of Women’s Abortion Rights, denied that
there was “‘a safety problem with abortion in Florida.’”  Saletan, supra note 40.
62. Press Release, Open Letter to Patients, supra note 57.
63. William Saletan writes of the failure twenty years ago of the “private qual-
ity-control system” in Florida.  Saletan, supra note 36.  The NAF, “[u]nsatisfied by
the clinic’s methods or conduct,” had rejected the membership application of the
deplorable Dadeland Family Planning Center. Id.  “But [this] verdict[ ] carried no
force.  Women seeking abortions wanted them done quickly and anonymously.
They relied on ads in the Yellow Pages.  Under these circumstances, the clinic’s
poor record hadn’t hurt business.” Id.
64. Press Release, Open Letter to Patients, supra note 57 (underline omitted).
65. For a response to the argument that it is hypocritical for pro-lifers, who
seek to make abortion illegal, to insist upon safe abortion conditions for women,
see supra note 56.
66. The NAF presumably is quite embarrassed by its interaction with Dr. Gos-
nell.  The NAF press release touts the fact that Dr. Gosnell was rejected for mem-
bership, but fails to disclose that the NAF did not reveal the clinic’s many
shortcomings. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  The Gosnell grand jury
report notes that the NAF evaluator believed his clinic to be “the worst . . . she had
ever inspected.”  Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 13.  Yet, she “never told
anyone in authority about all the horrible, dangerous things she had seen.” Id.
The report later questions why “an evaluator from NAF, whose stated mission is to
ensure safe, legal, and acceptable abortion care,” failed to report Dr. Gosnell. Id.
at 95.  The NAF’s silence was predictable based on its past conduct, as it also failed
to disclose the “awful” conditions of Florida’s Dadeland clinic when its member-
ship application was rejected. See Saletan, supra note 36.  Saletan later notes, how-
ever, that the NAF’s Massachusetts affiliate was “outraged” at the failure of
knowledgeable colleagues to report an abortion provider’s “sexual misconduct
13
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Another long-standing pro-choice argument against clinic regulation
has resurfaced in the Gosnell situation.  Dayle Steinberg, president of
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, asserts that because
abortion is already regulated, “ ‘no new regulations can stop a physician
who decides to disregard the law.’”67  This argument proves too much
because its premise—that the law is no constraint to those determined to
break it—would destroy the justification for all laws on any subject.  More-
over, Ms. Steinberg presupposes that “the law” she refers to is adequate for
its purposes.  Finally, her stance is strikingly inconsistent with the posture
of Planned Parenthood (PP) in the earlier Florida conflict over clinic reg-
ulation.  At that time, Florida PP affiliates did not perform abortions, but
they did refer “several thousand women to abortion providers each
year.”68  PP “regularly and thoroughly inspected any clinic or doctor’s of-
fice that sought patient referrals for abortions.”69  But PP, concerned
about the safety of all Florida abortion providers and not just its own refer-
rals, also supported state clinic regulation.70  “How could it oppose stan-
with a female patient.”  William Saletan, The Next Gosnell: Reckless Rogue Abortionists
and What We Can Learn from Them, SLATE (Feb. 25, 2011, 7:16 AM), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_back_alley/2011/02/
the_next_gosnell.single.html.  If the silent ones thought “‘they were protecting the
abortion rights movement, they could not have been more wrong.  They certainly
were not protecting the women of this state.’” Id. (quoting spokesperson for
NAF’s Massachusetts affiliate).  The NAF’s acknowledgment of a duty to report
sexual assault is laudable, but, as the Gosnell, Maryland, and Florida situations
demonstrate, women also need protection from the harm done to them by abor-
tion providers who either will not or cannot satisfy the NAF’s safety standards.  For
refutation of the argument that abortion-seekers should, under free-market princi-
ples, themselves decide the level of safety for which they want to pay, see infra note
74.
67. Marie McCullough, Grand Jury Faults State Regulators for Not Stopping Abor-
tion Doctor Charged with Murders, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 20, 2011, at A1.  Professor
Tracy Weitz agrees: “ ‘You don’t need more regulations for people operating
outside the bounds.  It’s a horrendous situation and we are all taking different
lessons from the story, but the lesson none of us should take is more regulation,
because [Gosnell] was already outside the regulations.’”  Murtha, supra note 3.
This argument also appeared during the Florida controversy.  The ACLU claimed:
“‘No matter how many laws are passed, there will always be a very small number of
individuals who will disregard the law and disregard their responsibilities to the
people they serve. . . .  More laws will not change unscrupulous people’s hearts.’”
Saletan, supra note 36.
68. Saletan, supra note 40.
69. Id.
70. See id.  PP’s lobbyist, Carolyn Pardue, referring to those pro-choice groups
that supported regulation, stated:
“They are committed to insuring that women referred to clinics have the
best assurance they can that the state and clinics have worked together to
provide safe environments and safe physicians.  These groups realized
that, under current enforcement procedures, they cannot have confi-
dence that the clinics are meeting uniform standards that insure [sic]
safety.”
Saletan, supra note 35.
14
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dards less stringent than its own?”71  Contrast this approach with Ms.
Steinberg’s position.  She extols the safety of PP clinics: “Planned
Parenthood maintains strict policies and procedures to ensure the highest
standard of health care.”72  But she opposes any state involvement in clinic
regulation beyond an annual inspection.73  Where is her concern for wo-
men who do not go to PP clinics?74
71. Saletan, supra note 40.  The “simple sanitation standards” that the bill’s
sponsor wanted to include “were paltry compared to” those of PP.  Saletan, supra
note 35.  Although Florida PP is to be commended for persevering in its support of
regulation despite opposition from many other pro-choice groups, a more com-
plete commitment to women’s safety would have led it to push for statewide stan-
dards equivalent to its own. See id.; supra note 35.
72. Steinberg, supra note 23.
73. See Stacey Burling, Foes of Abortion See Opportunity to Make Rules Stricter,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 24, 2011, at B1 (“As for stepping up regulation, [Steinberg]
said it was a good idea for the state to inspect abortion clinics annually, but that
other rules could just increase bureaucracy and heighten barriers for patients.”).
William Saletan argues that the Florida clinic experience demonstrates how inade-
quate a simple inspection system can be. See Saletan, supra note 36.
74. One could conceivably make a “free-market” objection to abortion clinic
safety regulations.  The argument is that safety standards must always be evaluated
in relation to cost.  Some people are willing to pay more for greater safety, whereas
others are willing to pay less, recognizing that this will mean less safety.  It is best to
leave such decisions to individuals.  A current example of this debate involves table
saw safety.  Available technology, Sawstop, could significantly reduce the 4,000 am-
putations Americans suffer each year via table saw accidents. See Chris Arnold, If
Table Saws Can Be Safer, Why Aren’t They?, NPR (June 18, 2011), http://npr.org/
2011/06/18/137258370/if-table-saws-can-be-safer-why-arent-they.  Major manufac-
turers, however, have not installed Sawstop because they do not think it would be
profitable. See id.  The National Consumers League wants to make Sawstop
mandatory. See id.  The power tool companies’ response: “ ‘Sawstop is currently
available in the marketplace to any consumer who chooses to purchase it.’” Id.
(quoting their attorney).
As another component of its free-market perspective, the industry supports
“voluntary table-saw safety rules.” See Jayne O’Donnell, Consumer Agency Pushes
Ahead on Table-Saw Rules, USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 2011, at 1B.  Nonetheless, the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has unanimously approved an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking on table saws.  Statement of Chairman Inez M.
Tenenbaum on the Commission Decision to Issue an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPR) for Performance Requirements to Address Table Saw Blade
Contact Injuries (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/pr/
tenenbaum10052011.pdf.  For a helpful summary of this controversy, see Chris Ar-
nold, 2012 Could See New Regulations for Table Saws, NPR (Dec. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/29/144417825/2012-could-see-new-regs-for-table-
saws.
A “leave-it-to-consumer-choice” argument would be unpersuasive if offered by
pro-choice organizations that, by implementing their own stringent safety stan-
dards, have likely profited from the increased business that enhanced safety pre-
sumably brings. See infra note 84.  Moreover, for decades these groups have touted
the safety of legal abortions over illegal abortions. See supra note 38 and accompa-
nying text. To argue that Gosnell’s patients chose to buy the particular level of
safety that he provided would evince a startling lack of true concern for the many
women he severely injured, and, in some cases, killed.  In addition, unsafe abor-
tion practices are not limited to Dr. Gosnell.  The horrific Maryland and Florida
episodes have already been discussed. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying
15
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Thus, the NAF and PP appear not to be wholly committed to women’s
safety.  Within its own jurisdictional confines, each insists that abortion
providers meet strict standards, yet each is willing to accord less protection
to women seeking abortions in other places.75  This is an anomaly that
needs correcting, but the rigorous internal requirements that both organi-
zations impose reveal the weakness of several other pro-choice arguments
against clinic regulation.  One claim is that no new regulations are
needed.  It is asserted, for example, that Dr. Gosnell would have been
stopped had Pennsylvania officials only complied with existing law.76  Even
if this proposition is true,77 an anti-regulation stance is not advanced be-
cause existing Pennsylvania law requires “all abortion facilities to meet
state-mandated administrative, professional qualification, patient testing,
and physical-plant requirements.”78
Pro-choicers also complain that government regulations will increase
the cost of abortion and thus drive women to unsafe providers.79  But what
text.  AUL describes evidence from other states showing “that abortion clinics are
the true ‘back-alleys’ that abortion advocates warned us about.”  Denise M. Burke,
Introduction to AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, ABORTION PATIENTS’ ENHANCED SAFETY ACT:
MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY GUIDE 3 (2010).  “Legalized abortion has not elimi-
nated substandard medical care, kept people without medical licenses from per-
forming abortions, ended the use of dirty, unsanitary procedure rooms and
unsterile, inadequate instrumentation, ensured competent post-abortion care, nor
prevented women from dying from unsafe abortions.” Id. at 2-3.  One would hope
that PP would be concerned about helping to ensure the safety of all women,
rather than telling them to decide for themselves how much safety they are willing
to pay for.  For more thoughts related to a free-market critique of state clinic regu-
lation, see supra note 39, infra notes 105-08, and accompanying text.
75. For an argument that pro-lifers, who seek to make most abortions illegal,
are not subject to this critique, see supra note 56.
76. See Otterbein, supra note 41.
77. The Gosnell grand jury concludes that several government agencies could
have shut down Dr. Gosnell had they only done their jobs. See Report of the Grand
Jury, supra note 6, at 8-13; see also Amy Worden, Crackdown on Abortion Clinics Clears
Pa. Senate, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 15, 2011, at B1.  The most interesting finding,
however, is why the Pennsylvania Department of Health (PDH), the “first line of
defense,” failed.  Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that PDH was
“first line of defense”).  The PDH conducted a few inspections between 1973
(when Gosnell’s clinic opened) and 1993, but it did not inspect the clinic again
until February of 2010. See id. at 9, 44.  What was the reason for what one colum-
nist calls this “[a]stonishing[ ]” inspection-free gap?  Heller, supra note 13.  It was
politics—more specifically, pro-choice politics.  “With the change of administra-
tion from [pro-life] Governor Casey to [pro-choice] Governor Ridge, officials con-
cluded that inspections would be ‘putting a barrier up to women’ seeking
abortions.  Better to leave clinics to do as they pleased, even though, as Gosnell
proved, that meant both women and babies would pay.”  Report of the Grand Jury,
supra note 6, at 9.
78. Burke, supra note 22 (citing 28 PA. CODE § 29.33 (2011)).
79. See Frontline: Interview Bonnie Scott Jones (PBS television broadcast Nov. 8,
2005) [hereinafter PBS Interview], available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/clinic/interviews/scottjones.html.  A young woman who spoke against
Virginia’s proposed new clinic regulations included pregnant women themselves
as potential unsafe abortion providers: “ ‘Hopefully you’re thinking a little bit
16
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about the safety regulations that both the NAF and PP themselves impose?
Don’t they presumably have the same impact?80  The NAF and PP no
doubt would argue that they require only what is necessary to ensure wo-
men’s safety, a response that alludes to a principal pro-choice critique of
state clinic regulation—that it goes too far by imposing needless require-
ments.81  In principle, this is a fair point.  To the extent that state regula-
tion is not reasonably related to ensuring women’s health, it unnecessarily
increases the cost of abortion.82  This, in turn, could push women toward
more risky providers by forcing some clinics to close and putting those
that remain open beyond the financial reach of some women,83 who
might then choose cheaper, presumably less safe, alternatives.84  Moreo-
ver, excessive state regulation could well be unconstitutional.85
about what you’re voting for . . . .  About where young women are going to go for
these procedures, about whether they’re going to try and do them for them-
selves.’”  Nolan, supra note 46.  These regulations were ultimately adopted. See
infra note 94.
80. Tyhisha Hudson’s experience is evidence of the effect of PP’s regulations
on cost.  She had a “gruesome experience” at Dr. Gosnell’s clinic after choosing
him over a PP clinic due to his lower cost.  Otterbein, supra note 41.  This unfortu-
nate occurrence does not mean that PP should relax or abandon its standards.
The goal of safe abortions is legitimate and should be pursued, even if a collateral
effect may be that some women will go to unsafe providers.
81. See PBS Interview, supra note 79.
82. Impact on the cost of abortion is a key element in evaluating the constitu-
tionality of clinic regulations under the federal “undue burden” standard. See Tuc-
son Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 541-42 (9th Cir. 2004); Greenville
Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 169-72 (4th Cir. 2000); infra note 85.
83. Clinic closings are not a bad thing per se.  If a clinic is forced to close due
to the inability or unwillingness to meet appropriate safety standards, the closing
properly advances the goal of protecting women’s health.  It is only inappropriate
safety requirements that are problematic.
84. Even appropriate regulations could make complying clinics too expensive
for some women.  These clinics, however, could still very well garner increased
overall business from an enhanced reputation for safety.  Achieving this competi-
tive advantage is no doubt one reason that PP (for its in-house abortion business)
and NAF (for the clinics it endorses) insist upon high safety standards.  For any
who doubt that a major reason PP promotes abortion is the profit the procedure
produces, see JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 114-15, 121, 130, 137, 143-44, 152, 174-75,
204, 246.  Johnson, a former PP clinic director who now is pro-life, also suspects
that the “big money to be made” explains PP’s decision to begin offering late-term
abortions in Houston, Texas. See id. at 111-12.
85. Invalidation might be based on the federal “undue burden” standard.
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a
state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. . . .  In
our considered judgment, an undue burden is an unconstitutional
burden.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opin-
ion).  This principle applies to “[r]egulations designed to foster the health of a
woman seeking an abortion.” Id. at 878.  “Unnecessary health regulations that
have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking
an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.” Id.  Under this formulation,
an unnecessary regulation would not ipso facto be unconstitutional.  There must
17
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to outline a specific regulatory
scheme that provides enough protection, but not too much.  Both sides of
the abortion controversy, however, should commit to working together to
hammer out appropriate rules.  Although there is likely to be disagree-
ment about what requirements are reasonable at every stage of preg-
nancy,86 first-trimester abortions will likely be a chief point of contention.
They are safer than later procedures,87 and thus they require less stringent
regulation.88  Later abortions merit greater safety restrictions, but these
also be a finding that the regulation had the purpose or effect of creating a sub-
stantial obstacle to a woman’s obtaining an abortion. See Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968, 973-74 (1997) (overturning preliminary injunction against Montana
statute restricting performance of abortions to licensed physicians even though
evidence suggested that physician-assistants were equally competent). But see Gil-
lian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. 865,
891 n.118 (2007) (arguing that unnecessary regulation may be unconstitutional
even if it does not constitute undue burden).  Even if a statute were upheld against
a federal constitutional challenge, it could still be invalidated under state law. See
Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 376 (Mont. 1999) (invalidating Montana “physi-
cian-only” statute under state constitutional principles that accord more protection
to women’s privacy than federal undue burden standard).  Some state constitu-
tional challenges, of course, could fail. See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Am.
Ass’n of Pro-life Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 257 P.3d 181 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011)
(upholding physicians-only requirement for surgical abortions).  For a compre-
hensive evaluation of how state constitutional law impacts abortion, see PAUL BEN-
JAMIN LINTON, ABORTION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS
(2008).
86. For the argument that it is excessive to subject second-trimester abortion
clinics to the same requirements imposed upon ambulatory surgical centers, see
Bonnie Scott Jones & Tracy A. Weitz, Legal Barriers to Second-Trimester Abortion Provi-
sion and Public Health Consequences, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 623 (2009).  Whatever
the merits of this claim, the Supreme Court, even before its adoption of the more
lenient undue burden standard, has allowed the states considerable latitude in
promulgating health and safety regulations for later abortions.  For example, in
Simopoulos v. Virginia, the Court first reaffirmed “that a State has an ‘important and
legitimate interest in the health of the mother’ that becomes ‘compelling . . . at
approximately the end of the first trimester.’”  Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S.
506, 510-11 (1983) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)) (internal
quotations omitted).  The Court then upheld a Virginia law that required that all
second-trimester abortions “be performed in an outpatient surgical hospital . . .
licensed as a ‘hospital’ by the State.” Id. at 515, 518-19.
87. See Christine Dehlendorf & Tracy Weitz, Access to Abortion Services: A Ne-
glected Health Disparity, 22 J. HEALTH CARE POOR & UNDERSERVED 415, 417 (2011)
(“For each week of gestation after 8 weeks, the risk of mortality increases and most
abortion-related mortalities could be eliminated if women obtained their abor-
tions prior to 8 weeks of pregnancy.  As such, there are significant health conse-
quences from delayed access to care.” (citation omitted)).
88. Pro-lifers implicitly acknowledge this fact by minimizing the impact on
women’s safety should abortion ever again be generally prohibited.  They argue
that advances in abortion practice have dissipated the specter of back-alley abor-
tions so commonly relied upon by pro-choicers. See JOHN C. WILLKIE & BARBARA H.
WILLKE, WHY NOT LOVE THEM BOTH?  QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT ABORTION
213-23 (1997); see also BERNARD N. NATHANSON & RICHARD N. OSTLING, ABORTING
AMERICA 196-98 (1979).
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too must be fine-tuned to assure that they do not go too far89 or, even
worse, are irrelevant to health risks altogether.90
This collaborative process would require both sides to resist tempta-
tion.  Pro-lifers must avoid seeking excessive regulations, whether in good
faith or with the hidden objective of driving abortion providers out of busi-
ness.91  Pro-choicers must resist the temptation to fight any state regula-
tion, no matter how benign.92  If the opponents can accomplish these
89. A likely example of excessiveness is requiring all abortion providers to
“‘have admitting privileges at a local hospital’” in situations in which the abortion
“‘clinic is already required to have a transfer agreement with a hospital 15 minutes
away . . . [to] accept the patients of the clinic in an emergency and treat them.’”
PBS Interview, supra note 79.
90. See Amalia W. Jorns, Note, Challenging Warrantless Inspections of Abortion
Providers: A New Constitutional Strategy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1563, 1594 (2005) (“Pro-
visions regulating the width of doorways or mandating that areas outside a clinic
are ‘kept free of rubbish, grass, and weeds’ should make a court skeptical of
whether the actual purpose of  these [regulations] . . . is to protect the safety of
women receiving medical treatment at abortion clinics.” (footnote omitted)).
Jorns makes a good point with the exception of doorway width.  It is prudent to
ensure that doorways are wide enough to accommodate any reasonably foreseeable
passage requirements of medical personnel and equipment.  There are numerous
other examples of irrelevant provisions. See, e.g., Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden,
379 F.3d 531, 554 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing requirement that patients be in-
formed of their right “‘[t]o be treated with consideration, respect, and full recog-
nition of the[ir] dignity and individuality’”); PBS Interview, supra note 79
(discussing requirement that clinic “‘be located in an attractive setting’”).  The
first example has been invalidated as unconstitutionally vague. See Tucson Woman’s
Clinic, 379 F.3d at 555.
91. Integrity issues arise for any pro-lifers who claim that regulations are de-
signed to protect women’s health, not to shut down clinics, yet then knowingly
advocate measures not reasonably related to women’s safety.  For an example of a
pro-life legislator who opposed, on integrity grounds, proposed Indiana regula-
tions that she thought were intended to close abortion clinics, see Dawn Johnsen,
“TRAP”ing Roe in Indiana and a Common-Ground Alternative, 118 YALE L.J. 1356,
1373-74 (2009).
92. Pro-choicers have coined the phrase, TRAP (Targeted Regulation of
Abortion Providers) law, to describe abortion clinic regulations. See Schulte, supra
note 48.  “TRAP” was obviously selected for its perceived rhetorical power.  The
underlying objection is that such provisions “singl[e] out abortion clinics over sim-
ilar medical practices.”  Michael Martz & Jim Nolan, Abortion Regulations Tougher
than Others; Rules Not Like Those for Other Outpatient Procedures, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 26, 2011, at A1; see PBS Interview, supra note 79.  Even if one assumes
that singling out has occurred, one response is that this result is entirely under-
standable given that it is a public tragedy or expose´ of scandalous conditions that
often flags abortion clinics for legislative attention.  Arizona, for example, enacted
new regulations over a decade ago due to “the ‘horrific events’ surrounding the
practice of abortion doctor John Biskind,” who was charged with (and later con-
victed of) manslaughter for killing Lou Anne Herron and “allegedly nearly
abort[ing] a 37-week-old fetus he claim[ed] he thought was younger.”  Tom Col-
lins, Tucson Lawsuit Aims to Block New Abortion Law, TUCSON CITIZEN, Mar. 2, 2000,
at 1C; see Denise M. Burke, Abortion Clinic Regulation: Combating the True “Back Alley”,
in THE COST OF “CHOICE”: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION, supra note
50, at 122, 124 (providing additional examples of how revelation of poor clinic
conditions led to state regulation).  Moreover, exactly why is singling out problem-
atic? If abortion clinic regulations are limited to those that protect women, one
19
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objectives, they will have implemented what William Saletan says is the
“lesson of Florida”: “[T]hat pro-choicers should surrender this categorical
aversion to legislation.  And pro-lifers should respect the neutrality of
clinic safety regulation instead of using it to impede abortions.”93
Evidence already exists of how difficult it will be for both sides to re-
sist these temptations.  Pro-lifers in Virginia seem determined to subject
first-trimester abortion clinics to the standards applicable to outpatient
hospitals.94  This is an outcome supported by AUL, which promotes the
Abortion Patients’ Enhanced Safety Act (APESA).95  This model statute
“requires abortion clinics to meet the same health, safety, staffing, and
other standards as ambulatory surgical centers, healthcare facilities that
specialize in providing outpatient surgeries.”96  AUL refers to this law “as
the ‘gold standard’ of abortion care.”97  This no doubt is true, but it is
questionable whether the law comports with AUL’s goal of imposing only
would think that pro-choicers would be glad that women will receive extra protec-
tion even if others similarly situated do not.  Instead, they complain that women
are being denied the equal protection of the laws. See id.; Dena Potter, Va. OKs Bill
to Likely Close Most Abortion Clinics, ABC NEWS, Feb. 25, 2011, http://abcnews.go.
com/US/wireStory?id=12994256#.TzAkqsVbc24.  Since the 1992 Casey decision,
such equal protection claims have not fared well in court. See, e.g., Tucson Woman’s
Clinic, 379 F.3d at 543-49; Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 172-
75 (4th Cir. 2000).  For one scholar’s argument that equal protection attacks on
abortion regulations are likely to fail, see Metzger, supra note 85, at 882-98.  Metz-
ger thinks that ordinary administrative law offers a more promising alternative for
policing unnecessary abortion clinic regulations. See id. at 898-906.
93. Saletan, supra note 66.
94. See supra note 43.  Prior to the Virginia State Board of Health’s promulga-
tion of applicable standards, it was not certain what the new Virginia law would
actually impose.  Pro-life advocates argued that the Board would impose only “‘ap-
propriate regulations,’” but pro-choicers feared “‘completely unnecessary’” re-
quirements that could drive some abortion clinics out of business.  Helderman,
supra note 43.  It is not surprising that the combatants are similarly contradictory
in characterizing the regulations ultimately adopted by the Board on September
15, 2011.  A pro-life advocate applauded the vote.  “ ‘Today’s action . . . ensures
that those women who make the unfortunate choice of abortion will at least go to
abortion centers that have met minimal safety standards.’”  Nolan, supra note 46
(quoting vice president of Family Foundation of Virginia).  The executive director
of NARAL Pro-Choice Virginia, however, stated that “ ‘[w]e are here today not be-
cause of a concern over women’s health . . . [but] because of a political battle that
has raged in this state for decades.’”  Kumar, supra note 46.  Governor Bob Mc-
Donnell recently approved the regulations previously adopted by the Board. See
McDonnell Approves New Abortion Clinic Regulations, ABC13 WVEC, Dec. 29, 2011,
http://www.wvec.com/home/McDonnell-approves-new-abortion-clinic-regula-
tions-136403983.html.
95. See AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, ABORTION PATIENTS’ ENHANCED SAFETY ACT:
MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY GUIDE (2010) [hereinafter AUL MODEL ACT] (out-
lining proposed legislation).  The APESA is one of two model acts promulgated by
AUL.  The other is the Women’s Health Protection Act (WHPA), which “is based
on national abortion care standards.” AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, WOMEN’S HEALTH
PROTECTION ACT (ABORTION CLINIC REGULATIONS): MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY
GUIDE (2011) [hereinafter MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY GUIDE].
96. See Burke, supra note 74, at 4.
97. Burke, supra note 22.
20
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those requirements that are “medically-appropriate.”98  The APESA, for
example, applies to any abortion facility, “other than an accredited hospi-
tal, in which five or more first trimester abortions in any month . . . are
performed.”99  If an abortion clinic performs only first-trimester abor-
tions, it goes too far to impose the enhanced standards applicable to out-
patient surgical facilities.100  AUL’s support of excessive requirements not
only belies its stated policy,101 but also risks invalidation under both
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey’s “undue bur-
den” standard102 and perhaps more rigorous state constitutional princi-
98. See id.
99. See AUL MODEL ACT, supra note 95, § 3(b).  The act also applies to a clinic
that performs “any second or third trimester abortions.” Id.
100. As already noted, pro-choice advocates argue that these requirements
are excessive even if limited to second-trimester abortions. See Jones & Weitz, supra
note 86.  The above text, however, levies an excessiveness charge only against first-
trimester abortions.  Evidence from the AUL itself suggests that the allegation is
accurate.  AUL refers to the APESA as the “‘gold standard’” of abortion regula-
tions, a description corroborated by the phrase “Enhanced Safety” in the act’s title.
See Burke, supra note 22 (discussing APESA).  The implication is that a less rigor-
ous regulatory scheme would be sufficient.  This in fact is AUL’s position, as
demonstrated by its promotion of the WHPA. See MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY
GUIDE, supra note 95.  The AUL offers this alternative model legislation “[t]o help
remedy the epidemic of substandard conditions at the nation’s abortion clinics.”
Burke, supra note 74, at 4.  Moreover, in promoting the APESA, AUL refers to
“states that have already enacted minimal health and safety regulations for abor-
tion clinics.” AUL MODEL ACT, supra note 95.  This reference would obviously in-
clude those states that had enacted the WHPA or something similar.  It thus seems
that AUL believes that the APESA is not essential for women’s health and safety.
101. See supra text accompanying note 98.  In a recent book, AUL Senior
Counsel Clarke Forsythe uses language suggesting that the goal of supporting
clinic regulation may actually go beyond protecting women.  He describes such
laws as one example of a “fence[ ] around Roe . . . .  [I]t is understood by virtually
all legislators and lobbyists that [such] regulations are intended to limit the abor-
tion right because prohibitions are not possible.” CLARKE D. FORSYTHE, POLITICS
FOR THE GREATEST GOOD: THE CASE FOR PRUDENCE IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 175
(2009); see Johnsen, supra note 91, at 1360 (describing similar statement by James
Bopp of National Right to Life Committee); Heller, supra note 13 (claiming that
Bopp’s statement makes it “nonsense” to argue that one’s stance on clinic regula-
tion has nothing to do with one’s position on abortion).  Forsythe goes on to say
that “regulatory fences [including abortion clinic regulation] have significantly re-
duced the number of abortions.” FORSYTHE, supra, at 178.  These statements make
it doubtful that Forsythe would agree with this Article’s endorsement of William
Saletan’s advice to respect the neutrality of clinic regulations and not use them to
restrict abortion per se. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.  If so, this
would be unfortunate.  Forsythe criticizes the Supreme Court for subjecting wo-
men to the risks of unsafe providers. See FORSYTHE, supra, at 184.  Carefully tailored
safety regulations are the best way to protect women.  Excessive measures simply
invite litigation. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
102. 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).  As noted, the mere fact of excessiveness does
not in itself guarantee invalidation. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  Still,
excessiveness invites judicial scrutiny.  This is a real risk despite Greenville Women’s
Clinic v. Bryant, which upheld South Carolina’s abortion clinic regulations against
an undue burden challenge. See Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d
157, 166-72 (4th Cir. 2000).  It is true that the requirements in dispute, like those
21
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ples.103  Pushing excessive health and safety standards also provides pro-
choicers with a valuable strategic opportunity, one of which they are well
aware—the chance to “portray abortion foes as radical.”104
Pro-choicers also need to change.  Many still evince a virtually blanket
opposition to state regulation.  Some have even resisted state efforts to
impose minimal regulations like the NAF’s own internal standards for ap-
proving clinics.105  Pro-choicers invoke the National Rifle Association
(NRA) to explain such total opposition.  Fighting state regulation of abor-
tion clinic safety is likened to the NRA’s stand against governmental gun
control.106  “ ‘The essence of true conservatism . . . is keeping government
out of your private life.’”107  This general anti-government sentiment is
too vague to advance the debate.  Even the most ardent libertarian sup-
ports government intervention under certain circumstances.108  What one
in the APESA and in the new Virginia regulations, applied to any clinic “‘in which
any second trimester or five or more first trimester abortions are performed in a
month.’” Id. at 160 (citation omitted); see supra note 43 and text accompanying
note 99.  There is a major distinction, however, between the South Carolina regu-
lations and the other two examples.  The latter subject first-trimester abortion clin-
ics to the standards of ambulatory surgical facilities, whereas South Carolina
imposed requirements substantially consistent with those endorsed by major pro-
choice organizations, including PP and the NAF. See Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222
F.3d at 169.  Thus, Greenville Women’s Clinic does not ensure that a law like the
APESA would necessarily be upheld.  It should also be noted that the Ninth Circuit
found enough merit in a challenge to Arizona’s clinic regulations, which were like
those of South Carolina, to deny the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
See infra note 111.
103. For an example from Montana, see supra note 85.
104. See Emily Bazelon, The Reincarnation of Pro-life, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 29,
2011, at MM13.
105. See William Saletan, The Sunshine State: What Reporters and Health Inspectors
Found in Florida’s Worst Abortion Clinics, SLATE (Feb. 22, 2011, 7:23 AM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_back_alley/2011/02/thesunshine-
state.single.html.  For another example of pro-choicers’ antipathy to even the
mildest regulations, see supra note 35.
106. See Saletan, supra note 36 (comparing anti-regulatory stance in abortion
to gun control).
107. Id. (quoting director of Florida pro-choice organization).  For an earlier
discussion of a general anti-regulatory stance, see supra notes 39, 74.
108. A. Barton Hinkle argues that conventional labels like “conservative” and
“liberal” are not predictive of where one stands on clinic regulation.  “[M]any so-
called conservatives believe in limited government everywhere except the uterus.”
Hinkle, supra note 39.  And “[s]uddenly, outraged liberals are sounding remarka-
bly like libertarian advocates of laissez-faire capitalism and the industries they de-
fend.” Id.  How can one explain “[t]he fact that progressive defenders of abortion
rights suddenly sound like Milton Friedman and Ronald Reagan”? Id.  One
possibility
is that abortion providers differ from every other entity in the universe—
that they are uniquely pure of heart and incapable of error, and there-
fore ought to be left alone to do their good work in peace while benefi-
cent government agencies impose increasingly strict oversight on the
troglodytes and imbeciles who run everything else.
Id.  “The other,” clearly Hinkle’s view, “is that when it comes to the excesses of the
modern regulatory state and the danger of giving government in general too much
22
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does in a particular case depends upon balancing the perceived positives
and negatives of state intervention.  What will state regulation accomplish?
Are these desired outcomes worth what must be given up to attain them?
The question for pro-choicers is this: If clinic regulations are limited to
measures protective of women, what reasons justify continuing opposition?
Pro-choicers could assert that once the door is opened to state safety
regulations, lawmakers will branch out to regulate abortion more broadly.
This argument is grounded in the venerable maxim: “Don’t let the camel’s
nose into the tent.”  The argument’s weakness in this context is that legis-
lators have already acted vigorously to regulate abortion in a variety of
ways.109  They have not needed the “camel’s nose” of safety regulations.
Perhaps, though, this explosion of pro-life-supported restraints shows a
more persuasive reason for pro-choice concern.  Can ardent pro-lifers be
counted on to confine the regulations to legitimate health and safety is-
sues?  Pro-lifers must demonstrate that they can be trusted by not over-
reaching.110  Pro-choicers can also take solace in the fact that the courts
power, the Milton Friedmans and Ronald Reagans of the world might—just
might—have a tiny shred of a point.” Id.
109. For a discussion of various abortion regulatory measures, see supra note
55.  A recent New York Times article states that in April 2011 alone, thirty state anti-
abortion laws were passed, and at least sixty-four have passed “since Republicans
took control of half the country’s statehouses [in 2011].”  Bazelon, supra note 104.
110. An example of pro-life overreaching contributed to an ongoing dispute
in Kansas concerning its recently enacted licensing requirements for abortion clin-
ics.  The new regulations were apparently implemented on an expedited basis that
made it impossible for opponents to comment, much less comply. See Press Re-
lease, Ctr. for Reproductive Rights, Center for Reproductive Rights Files Lawsuit
Against Kansas Abortion Clinic Regulations (June 28, 2011), available at http://
reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/center-for-reproductive-rights-files-lawsuit-
against-kansas-abortion-clinic-regulations.  Critics also allege that the new stan-
dards are not really about women’s safety.  According to Nancy Northup, president
of the Center for Reproductive Rights, “ ‘These requirements range from the im-
possible to the absurd . . . .  They’re not designed to protect patient safety; they’re
designed to shut down abortion providers.’”  A.G. Sulzberger & Monica Davey,
New Law in Kansas Seen as a Threat to Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2011, at A11.
Pro-lifers respond that the Kansas standards are based in large part on the NAF’s
own requirements. See Ciara Matthews, Abortion Backers Not Interested in Health,
Safety of Women, LIFENEWS.COM (July 21, 2011, 4:54 PM), http://www.lifenews.com/
2011/07/21/abortion-backers-not-interested-in-health-safety-of-women/ (“What is
being done in Kansas is not new, radical or extreme.  It constitutes reasonable
oversight of an industry that performs very invasive procedures . . . .  If the pro-
abortion community really were as ‘pro-woman’ as it claims, it would welcome any
protections aimed at keeping women safe.”).  The U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Kansas issued a preliminary injunction blocking the licensing provision. See
Ashley Hileman, Federal Judge Blocks Kansas Abortion Law Requiring Licenses for Clin-
ics, JURIST (July 2, 2011, 11:29 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/07/fed-
eral-judge-blocks-kansas-abortion-law-requiring-licenses-for-clinics.php.  The ruling
was based in “large part . . . on the very short time frame” given for compliance
with the new rules.  Brad Cooper, Federal Judge Blocks New Abortion Kansas Licensing
Rules, KANSAS CITY Star, July 1, 2011, http://www.womenhealthwizard.com/fed-
eral-judge-blocks-new-abortion-kansas-licensing-rules.  For an argument that Penn-
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are available as a deterrent to regulations not reasonably related to pro-
tecting women.111
Both adversaries in the abortion controversy will find it challenging to
join forces to impose reasonable clinic regulations.  Despite its difficulty,
the effort is worthwhile for all those truly committed to women’s safety.
III. KILLING BORN-ALIVE BABIES
Dr. Gosnell was indicted for the murder of seven babies born alive
and then killed.112  After using medication to induce labor and deliv-
ery,113 he stuck scissors into the babies’ necks and severed their spinal
cords.  He called this process “snipping.”114  According to the grand jury,
These killings became so routine that no one could put an exact
number on them.  They were considered “standard procedure.”
Yet some of the slaughtered were so fully formed, so much like
babies that should be dressed and taken home, that even clinic
employees who were accustomed to the practice were
shocked.115
sylvania’s recently enacted clinic regulation measure also reflects pro-life
overreaching, see supra note 41.
111. For a discussion of the applicable legal standard from the Casey decision,
see supra note 85 and accompanying text.  Pro-choice litigators lament the diffi-
culty of convincing a court that Casey has been violated. See PBS Interview, supra
note 79 (“‘I have not yet seen a case striking down a TRAP law on the grounds that
it violates that Casey standard.’”).  “[T]his new Casey standard really seems to make
it difficult, if not impossible, to challenge TRAP laws . . . .’” Id.  Some outcomes
support this pessimistic assessment. See supra note 102; see also Planned
Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Am. Ass’n of Pro-life Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
257 P.3d 181 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (upholding Arizona abortion clinic regulations
against state constitutional challenge by applying Casey standard).  There has, how-
ever, been at least one partial success.  In Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, the Ninth
Circuit sustained an undue burden challenge to Arizona’s abortion clinic regula-
tions against a motion for summary judgment. See Tucson Woman’s Clinic v.
Eden, 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004).  The court held that “a reasonable fact-finder
could find that the challenged set of statutes and regulations is unnecessary and
has the effect of imposing a substantial obstacle on women seeking an abortion.”
Id. at 542.  The lawsuit was ultimately settled. See Denise Burke, Arizona Abortion
Clinic Regulations Finally Go into Effect, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE (Oct. 29, 2010), http:/
/www.aul.org/2010/10/arizona-abortion-clinic-regulations-finally-go-into-effect/.
It is also important to note that state law principles could very well offer a promis-
ing avenue of redress against excessive clinic regulations. See supra note 85.
112. See Presentment at 23-24, In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury XXIII,
Misc. NO. 0009901-2008, (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.
phila.gov/districtattorney/PDFs/PresentmentFinalWomensMedical.pdf (describ-
ing indictment).
113. Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 25, 105.
114. Id. at 4.  The grand jury found this term to be “misleading” because of
the pressure necessary to cut through the vertebrae and spinal cord. See id. at 112.
115. Id. at 99-100.
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Dr. Gosnell joked about the size of one of the babies he killed: “ ‘This baby
is big enough to . . . walk me to the bus stop.’”116  The evidence also
showed that often these babies were breathing, moving, and/or crying
before they were killed.117
Other employees would sometimes perform the job of cutting babies’
necks.  On one occasion, a baby had moved and breathed for approxi-
mately twenty minutes when one clinic employee called another employee
over to look because this baby was moving its arms when they were pul-
led.118  “After playing with the baby, [the first employee] slit its neck.”119
These abhorrent facts should appall both pro-lifers and pro-choicers.
While pro-lifer condemnation is obvious, pro-choicers also have no reason
to defend the killing of these babies.  Once delivery has occurred, there is
no longer an ongoing abortion procedure.  Consequently, Roe and the
concept of a constitutional right to an abortion have no application.120  In
addition, the underlying philosophical premise of the pro-choice position
is a woman’s right to control her own body.  Once outside the mother, a
baby does not impinge on a woman’s sovereignty over her body.  The two
sides should thus unite in opposing the killing of born-alive infants.  This
assertion will hopefully achieve consensus, but a related claim might be
more controversial—that born-alive infants are entitled to legal protection
regardless of viability.
The grand jury report repeatedly states that the babies born alive
were viable when they were killed,121 thereby suggesting that viability is a
key criterion.  Pennsylvania law defines viability as “[t]hat stage of fetal
development when . . . there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained sur-
vival . . . outside the [mother’s] body . . . , with or without artificial sup-
port.”122  But what of infants born alive who are not viable?  Should Dr.
Gosnell or anyone else be able to kill them with impunity?
A person is guilty of murder under Pennsylvania law only if one inten-
tionally kills a “human being.”123  There is compelling evidence that a
baby born alive, regardless of viability, is a human being entitled to the
116. Id. at 102.
117. See id. at 103, 112, 114.
118. See id. at 104.
119. Id.
120. Roe makes plain that its impact is limited to the duration of the preg-
nancy. See Samuel W. Calhoun, “Partial-Birth Abortion” Is Not Abortion: Carhart II’s
Fundamental Misapplication of Roe, 79 MISS. L.J. 775, 779-80, 801-02 (2010).
121. See Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 99, 105, 107 (explaining
that Gosnell killed viable, born-alive babies).
122. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1998).  This definition technically does not
apply to a born child because the statute pertains to a determination of the survival
chances outside the woman’s body of an unborn child who, at the time of the
viability assessment, is still within the womb. See id.  The viability concept
originated, though, in evaluating the survival chances of premature infants.  Randy
Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 249, 257 (2009).
123. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2501(a), 2502(b).
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law’s protection.124  The most direct proof of the irrelevance of viability is
Pennsylvania’s infanticide statute, which provides that the Common-
wealth’s laws “shall not be construed to imply that any human being born
alive in the course of or as a result of an abortion or pregnancy termina-
tion, no matter what may be that human being’s chance of survival,
is not a person under the Constitution and laws of this Common-
wealth.”125  Double negatives often cause confusion, but not here.  To
state
that Pennsylvania law should not be construed to mean that a pre-
viable, born-alive infant “is not a person” is equivalent to saying that
such an infant is a person.  This is confirmed by the duty of care im-
posed upon medical personnel regarding “a child who is born alive dur-
ing the course of an abortion”—it must be provided “that type and
degree of care and treatment which, in the good faith judgment of the
physician, is commonly and customarily provided to any other person
under similar conditions and circumstances.”126  Thus, for born in-
124. The Pennsylvania criminal statutes do not define the term “human be-
ing.” See Commonwealth v. Brown, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 627, 630-31 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
1978) (“[W]e observe that the words [human being] are not defined in section
2501, describing criminal homicide, or in section 2502, describing the degrees of
murder.  Neither are they defined in any other section of the Crimes Code.”).
125. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3212(a) (2000). “Born alive” is defined as complete
separation from the mother, followed by “breath[ing,] . . . beating of the heart,
pulsation of the umbilical cord, definite movement of voluntary muscles or any
brain-wave activity.”  18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203. Although not expressly stated, it is
implied that a baby totally outside the mother, but still attached by the umbilical
cord, satisfies the complete separation criterion. Cf. id.  Professor Cynthia Gorney
points out that this definition could be construed to cover a post-abortion dismem-
bered fetus that, however fleetingly, “has a pulsating umbilical cord or a beating
heart.” Cynthia Gorney: Parsing the Politics of Abortion, NPR (Oct. 30, 2008), available
at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=96316327.
Even if true—and a court could well say that these statutes were intended to cover
only intact infants—no significant consequences would follow.  There would be no
need to attempt resuscitation of dismembered fetuses facing imminent, unavoida-
ble death. See infra note 127.
126. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3212(b) (emphasis added).  The Gosnell grand jury
recommended that he be charged with infanticide for his conduct in regard to two
viable babies, the only such instances not barred by the statute of limitations.  Re-
port of the Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 228-29.  In suggesting that the infanticide
statute applies only to viable infants, the grand jury ignored the plain language of
subsection 3212(a), which states that the personhood of born-alive babies does not
depend on “chance of survival.” See supra text accompanying note 125.  It would
be supremely ironic to interpret subsection 3212(b)’s duty of care as limited to
viable infants when subsection 3212(a) states that no Pennsylvania law—which pre-
sumably includes the very next subsection of the same statute—shall be inter-
preted to mean that any born-alive baby, regardless of chance of survival, is not a
person.
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fants, being alive, not viability,127 is the chief determinant of legal person-
hood.128
127. Viability would be relevant in evaluating what medical care should be
given to born-alive infants.  Viable infants should be given care to enhance their
chance of survival.  Non-viable infants should be given palliative care to ease their
impending deaths. See infra note 133.  But differentiation in type of care does not
signal a distinction in legal status.  The Pennsylvania infanticide statute treats all
born-alive babies, viable and non-viable, as persons entitled to appropriate medical
care. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.  These provisions contradict
the suggestion in the Pennsylvania Administrative Code that this duty applies only
post-viability. See 28 PA. CODE § 29.35 (2011).  Such an inference might be drawn
from the section’s title, “Abortion after viability.”  The language in the governing
statute should trump anything to the contrary in the implementing regulations.
Cf. 28 PA. CODE § 29.42 (explaining that Board of Health may grant exceptions to
its regulations “excepting statutory requirements”).
128. There is other substantiating evidence.  Direct support comes from
Hudak v. Georgy, which held that a wrongful death and survival action can be
brought on behalf of a baby born alive, but not viable.  Hudak v. Georgy, 634 A.2d
600 (Pa. 1993).  The court stated that to “interject[ ] the concept of viability into a
situation where a child [is] born alive confuses the issue.  Viability describes the
capacity of the unborn to survive outside the womb, and is not relevant when an
infant survives birth.” Id. at 602.  “[T]oday we are reaffirming the unremarkable
proposition that an infant born alive is, without qualification, a person.” Id. at 603.
Additional evidence of viability’s irrelevance to the personhood of born babies
comes from the common law’s “born alive rule,” long followed in Pennsylvania. See
Brown, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d at 635-38.  Under this principle, a homicide prosecution
could be maintained for killing a fetus via pre-birth injuries only if the fetus was
born alive and then died.  Commonwealth v. Booth, 766 A.2d 843, 849 (Pa. 2001)
(“In its simplest statement, the ‘born alive rule’ prescribes that only one who has
been born alive can be the victim of homicide.”).  To prove live birth, one had to
demonstrate that “ ‘the fetus [was] totally expelled from the mother and show[ed]
clear signs of independent vitality.’” Id. at 850 (quoting State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d
1257, 1259 (R.I. 1982)).  Breathing after birth satisfies this test. See id.  The Booth
court never even mentions the concept of viability in discussing the “stringent”
“[r]equirements for proof of live birth.” See id. at 849-50.
In 1997, Pennsylvania expanded the law’s protection of unborn children be-
yond that provided by the born-alive rule.  In the Crimes Against the Unborn
Child Act (Unborn Child Act), the Commonwealth created five separate crimes,
including murder, for “violence directed against unborn children.” See 1997 Pa.
Legis. Serv. 44 (West) (codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2601-09 (1998)); Booth,
766 A.2d at 853.  This law, although not directly pertinent to the issue of the per-
sonhood of born, but non-viable, babies, does demonstrate the irrelevance of via-
bility to satisfying the “aliveness” criterion necessary for a murder prosecution
under the born-alive rule.  The Unborn Child Act protects the unborn at all stages
of pregnancy by incorporating the definition of “unborn child” from Penn-
sylvania’s Abortion Control Act: “an individual organism of the species homo sapi-
ens from fertilization until live birth.” Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2602 (1998),
with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (2000).  The definition plainly makes viability irrele-
vant, which led to a claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because
“the concept of death is difficult to understand relative to a fetus that is not viable.”
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 212-13 (Pa. 2006).  The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania rejected the vagueness challenge:
[T]he concepts of life and its cessation are readily understandable to per-
sons of ordinary intelligence . . .  [T]o accept that a fetus is not biologi-
cally alive until it can survive outside of the womb would be illogical, as
such a concept would define fetal life in terms that depend upon external
27
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The Pennsylvania approach is consistent with the law in other
states129 and with the 2002 Federal Born-Alive Infant Protection Act.  Ac-
cording to the Act, for purposes of federal law, “the words ‘person’,
‘human being’, ‘child’, and ‘individual’, shall include every infant mem-
ber of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of develop-
ment.”130  This outcome is plainly correct.  Viability should not be a
prerequisite for the legal personhood of a baby born alive.131  Those with
lingering doubts should consider a hypothetical from Douglas Johnson of
the National Right to Life Committee:
conditions, namely, the existing state of medical technology . . . .  Accord-
ingly, viability outside of the womb is immaterial to the question of
whether the defendant’s actions have caused a cessation of the biological
life of the fetus.
Id. at 213.  If viability is irrelevant to assessing the aliveness of fetuses still within the
womb, it should certainly be irrelevant in evaluating whether fetuses once born are
alive so as to be proper subjects for the protection of the murder laws.
129. Support from other states takes various forms.  First, viability is irrelevant
under most state born-alive infant protection acts, enacted to confer legal protec-
tion upon babies born alive following an attempted abortion. See Calhoun, supra
note 120, at 791-92, 807 n.164.  Second, other states have agreed with Pennsylvania
that viability is not a prerequisite for a wrongful death action concerning a baby
who died following live birth. See Nealis v. Baird, 996 P.2d 438, 455 (Okla. 1999)
(“Reason dictates that a child, once born alive, must be recognized as a person
regardless of its ability to sustain life for any particular period of time thereafter.”
(emphasis omitted)); Grp. Health Ass’n v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198, 1206 (Md.
1983) (“[V]iability has no role . . . where the child is born alive.”); supra note 126.
Third, at least one court has stated that a doctor can be convicted of murder for
killing a non-viable, born-alive infant following an abortion attempt. See Showery v.
State, 690 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App. 1985). But cf. People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92, 94-
95 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (stating that viability is required, but belying this fact
by reciting the evidence that sufficed to demonstrate that “child was born alive and
became a human being”).  The Showery opinion is potentially confusing because,
while at one point it states that a murder charge cannot be constitutionally sus-
tained for killing “a nonviable fetus,” the court elsewhere emphasizes that the only
“viability” necessary is proof that the baby “had been born alive and was alive at the
time of the alleged conduct.” Showery, 690 S.W.2d at 692.  “If life is present, it may
not be affirmatively terminated regardless of the probability of natural or assisted
survival.” Id. at 693; see also id. at 694 (stating that “actual life, however fragile, at the
time of the . . . [accused’s] conduct,” is all that is needed (emphasis added)).  The
Showery facts bear a grim linguistic relationship to Dr. Gosnell’s actions.  The de-
fendant in Showery suffocated a born-alive baby by “placing the placenta over its
face, immersing it in liquid and sealing it in a plastic trash bag.” Id. at 691.  When
the Gosnell grand jury asked its “medical experts if there could be any legitimate,
medical purpose behind Gosnell’s practice [of severing the spinal cord], one said:
‘it would be the same as putting a pillow over the baby’s face, that the intention
would be to kill the baby.’”  Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 112.
130. 1 U.S.C. § 8(a) (2006).  For a discussion of the constitutionality of born-
alive infant protection acts, see Calhoun, supra note 120, at 792 n.86.
131. This is true even though the pre-viable baby could have been legally
aborted prior to its birth.  There is nothing unreasonable about taking advantage
of all that the law now allows—protecting the born-pre-viable child. See id. at 812-
821 (describing reasonableness of partial-birth abortion bans).  Those who want to
extend that protection to the unborn pre-viable child will have to wait until the
impediment of Roe is overcome.
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“Let’s say you have a baby born at twenty-two and three-quarters
weeks . . .  You have two neonatologists standing over the incuba-
tor, arguing about whether they should do this or that, whether
it’s futile, whether this baby has a chance.  Suddenly somebody
rushes in from the corridor and strikes the baby on the head with
a hammer.  Does anyone dispute that a homicide just occurred?
No.  One neonatologist may say a certain intervention is futile
here.  Another may say, ‘No, we should do this or that thing.’
But they’re both going to grab that guy and call the cops.”132
Johnson’s scenario persuasively demonstrates the irrelevance of viabil-
ity once live birth occurs,133 but an alteration makes it even more perti-
nent to the Gosnell facts.  Imagine that it is not an intruder who delivers
the fatal hammer blow, but the doctor who believed that the child was not
viable.  Even if one presumes this was an accurate diagnosis, can it be
doubted that the physician should be prosecuted for homicide?  Once a
baby is born alive, its personhood should not be contingent on its viabil-
132. Cynthia Gorney, Gambling with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think They Have
Everything to Lose, HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 2004, at 33, 44.  It is unclear whether John-
son’s reference to a birth date of just under twenty-three weeks refers to that
length of time from conception or instead from the beginning of the woman’s last
menstrual period, the standard method of measuring the length of a pregnancy.
See infra note 138.  From the context, however, he obviously intends to describe a
situation in which the baby’s viability is possible, but uncertain.
133. It might be objected that Johnson’s hypothetical appears to refer to a
normal delivery, not a live birth during an attempted abortion.  This difference,
however, is irrelevant.  Real-world facts must be faced.  A baby born alive is a baby
born alive, regardless of the attendant circumstances.  Pennsylvania law recognizes
this in the wide scope of its infanticide statute. See supra note 125 and accompany-
ing text.  As previously noted, an abortion context also does not preclude the ap-
plication of born-alive infant protection acts. See supra notes 129-30 and
accompanying text.  Two pro-choice scholars have implicitly corroborated the ir-
relevance of viability to the personhood of an infant born alive in an abortion
context.  Glenn Cohen and Sadath Sayeed pose a hypothetical in which a woman
in an abortion clinic “goes into active, uncontrollable labor and . . . deliver[s] an
extremely premature newborn.”  I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abor-
tion, Viability, and the Constitution, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 235, 237 (2011).  Given the
child’s “long odds”—i.e., its likely non-viability—the woman asks the clinic to
provide
care . . . to[ ] maximiz[e] comfort and ensur[e] dignity during the dying
process.  This palliative choice is respected by her providers because in
the U.S. pediatrics community, there is generally consensus that neonates
born below 23 weeks by LMP should not be resuscitated given their poor
chance of survival without significant disability.
Id.  For a discussion of “LMP” (last menstrual period), see infra note 138.  It is
telling that the authors do not envision an alternative method for dealing with
these early neonates—simply crush their heads with a hammer.  Palliative care
would also be the only appropriate treatment for live, non-viable, babies born not
from premature labor, but from their intentional or unintentional extraction from
the womb during an abortion procedure.  Again, a baby born alive is a baby born
alive, however this occurs.
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ity.134  This is the actual state of Pennsylvania law, and it is hoped that the
Gosnell grand jury report’s contrary suggestion will cause minimal
confusion.135
IV. PERFORMING ILLEGAL POST-VIABILITY ABORTIONS
Dr. Gosnell was indicted on thirty-three counts of performing illegal
late-term abortions,136 defined under Pennsylvania law as those per-
formed at a gestational age of twenty-four weeks or greater.137  It may
seem curious that this Part IV discusses illegal post-viability abortions when
the Pennsylvania statute’s definition of illegality does not even use the
term “viability.”  Discussing viability is appropriate because the legislature’s
apparent intent was to prohibit post-viability abortion.138  Consequently,
134. For an argument that the beginning of the birth process should trigger
legal protection, see Calhoun, supra note 120, at 790-811.
135. William Saletan clearly appears to have been influenced by the grand
jury report.  In commenting on Gosnell’s killing of born-alive infants, he empha-
sizes that the babies were viable.  William Saletan, The Baby Butcher: Pro-choice Abso-
lutism and the Grisly Abortion Scandal in Philadelphia, SLATE (Jan. 20, 2011, 8:48 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2011/01/
the_baby_butcher.single.html.
136. Presentment, supra note 112, at 33.  This is a surprisingly small number
given that the grand jury believed “that Gosnell performed scores more such abor-
tions.”  Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 232.  Many patient files, however,
were missing. See id. at 233.  In addition, Pennsylvania law has a two-year statute of
limitations. See id.
137. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3211(a) (2000).  The late-abortion prohibition has
two exceptions: one for abortions reasonably believed to be necessary to protect
the life or physical health of the woman, and the other for abortions of fetuses
reasonably thought to be under twenty-four gestational weeks of age. See id.
§ 3211(b).  The grand jury never discussed the potential application of either of
these exceptions, presumably because the underlying facts warranted neither.
138. The statute defines “gestational age” as “[t]he age of the unborn child as
calculated from the first day of the last menstrual period of the pregnant woman.”
Id. § 3203.  Twenty-four weeks gestation by LMP is within the range of fetal viabil-
ity.  Cohen & Sayeed, supra note 133, at 236.  A gestational age of twenty-four
weeks by LMP, however, does not refer to a child twenty-four weeks from concep-
tion because “[c]onception is assumed to occur between 11 and 21 days after the
first day of the LMP.  The standard estimated gestational age by LMP, then, typi-
cally includes two ‘extra’ weeks prior to actual fertilization.” Id. at 235 n.3.  Thus,
the Pennsylvania cut-off for legal abortion is roughly twenty-two weeks from con-
ception.  For other indications of the legislature’s underlying interest in viability,
see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3211(c)(4)-(5).
Pennsylvania’s focus on gestational age as a proxy for viability is problematic
for two reasons.  On the one hand, the statutory scheme does not do enough to
ensure accurate calculations of gestational age.  While testing for gestational age
must be performed and reported, there is no immediate check of the reliability of
the results.  18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3210(a).  It would be a simple matter for an
abortion provider to falsify tests to escape the constraints imposed on twenty-four-
week abortions.  Dr. Gosnell, for example, taught his staff to manipulate ultra-
sound machines to produce false readings of younger fetuses.  Report of the
Grand Jury, supra note 6, at 79-80.  To truly deter late abortions, the assessment of
gestational age should require the contemporaneous judgment of an independent
physician, one with no business relationship with the abortion provider.  Although
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for purposes of discussion, the Pennsylvania statute will be treated as draw-
ing the line for legal abortion at viability.139  Can both pro-choicers and
pro-lifers agree with this line?
As for pro-choicers, it is fair to say that state restrictions on post-viabil-
ity abortions have not been a primary focus.  This is so for two reasons.
First, the vast majority of abortions occur before fetal viability.140  Second,
the Supreme Court will uphold a state prohibition of post-viability abor-
tion only if the statute has an exception allowing the abortion when the
life or health of the mother is at risk.141  “Health” has been broadly con-
making age testing more rigorous would be beneficial, doing so would highlight
the second problem with Pennsylvania’s approach—its prohibition of late abortion
is not expressed directly in terms of viability.  The Supreme Court has made it
clear that a state can generally prohibit abortion only after viability. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (plurality opinion) (rec-
ognizing that after viability, state’s interest in protecting fetus becomes compel-
ling); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 516, 516 n.14 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (noting compelling state interest in potential human life after
viability).  Pennsylvania in effect assumes the viability of all unborn children at
twenty-four weeks gestational age, but the Supreme Court has made it clear “that
the determination of viability is a matter for the judgment of the attending physi-
cian, and that therefore the legislature could not give one element, such as gesta-
tional age, dispositive weight.”  Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir.
1996) (citing Webster, 494 U.S. at 516-17).  The current statutory scheme may there-
fore be invalid.  A different approach could have stressed gestational age in a man-
ner likely to be constitutionally defensible—the statute could have presumed
viability at twenty-four weeks gestational age, but given the abortion provider the
opportunity for rebuttal by “tests indicating that the fetus is not viable prior to
performing” the procedure. Webster, 492 U.S. at 515.  The Supreme Court has up-
held this approach for a statute in effect presuming viability at twenty weeks gesta-
tional age. See id. at 515-21.
139. But see supra note 138 (arguing that gestational age may be an inade-
quate proxy for viability).
140. One pro-choice advocate states that “ ‘only 1.5% of abortions occur after
21 weeks of pregnancy.’”  William Saletan, The Baby Butcher, Revisited: Is It OK to
Abort a Viable Fetus?  An Answer to Pro-choicers on Kermit Gosnell, SLATE (Jan. 24, 2011,
8:04 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/
2011/01/the_baby_butcher_revisited.single.html (quoting Vanessa Valenti).  Al-
though the overall percentage of post-viability abortions is small, their number is
large enough to be a serious concern.  As Saletan notes, “1.5 percent of 1.2 million
abortions per year is 18,000 very late abortions.” Id.  To put this figure into per-
spective, consider this statement in a recent advocacy message from Allstate Insur-
ance Company in support of the STANDUP Act, a measure designed to reduce
teen traffic fatalities: “If 9 fully loaded jumbo jets crashed every year, something
would be done about it.  Every year, more than 4,000 teens die in car crashes.”  All-
state Ins. Co., Advertisement, WEEK, May 6, 2011, at back cover.
141. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.  It is important to note that the Court in Roe
did not accord any independent legal status to fetuses at viability.  The Court only
held that the states, should they decide to do so, can prohibit post-viability abor-
tions so long as they also enact the mandated exceptions.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 164-65 (1973) (“For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”). Casey reiterates this
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strued,142 so that in reality there are no meaningful legal restraints on a
woman’s ability to obtain a late abortion.143  One could be tempted from
the relative quiet on this particular issue to assume that all pro-choicers
are generally happy with the current state of the law.  But this conclusion
would be wrong.
William Saletan also addressed the post-viability aspect of the Gosnell
situation.144  In his initial piece, he quoted several examples of what he
called pro-choice absolutists.145  One such absolutist is Marge Berer,
founding editor of Reproductive Health Matters.  She says that “ ‘anyone who
thinks they have the right to refuse even one woman an abortion can’t
continue to claim they are pro-choice.’”146  Ann Furedi, chief executive of
the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, questioned:
“Is there anything qualitatively different about a fetus at, say, 28
weeks that gives it a morally different status to a fetus at 18 weeks
or even eight weeks? . . .  Why should we assume later abortions
are ‘bad’—or, at least, ‘more wrong’ than early ones? . . .  [I]n
later pregnancy, too, I believe that the decision, and the responsi-
bility that comes with it, should rest with the pregnant wo-
man. . . .  We either support women’s moral agency or we do
not. . . .  There is no middle ground to straddle.”147
formulation. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.  Some states have done nothing to protect
viable fetuses. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
143. This well-known fact makes it especially surprising, even galling, to see
continued inaccurate descriptions of Roe’s impact. See Mary Ann Glendon, From
Culture Wars to Building a Culture of Life, in THE COST OF “CHOICE”: WOMEN EVALU-
ATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION, supra note 50, at 6 (noting that “journalists and
other opinion leaders . . . have persisted in misdescribing Roe v. Wade”).  As just
one example of many, Yale professor Ian Shapiro states that Roe “established that
women have a constitutionally protected right to abortion in the early stages of
pregnancy.” ABORTION: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 1965-2007, at xiii (Ian Sha-
piro ed., 3d ed. 2007); see also Calhoun, supra note 120, at 817 n.219 (describing
other instances of incorrect accounts of Roe).  Shapiro’s language is particularly
misleading in that it does not even allude to the plain fact that under Roe the only
state abortion regulations allowed during the second trimester of pregnancy are
those related to maternal health. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (holding that, after
first trimester, state can regulate to extent that regulation reasonably relates to
preservation and protection of maternal health).  Thus, Shapiro, by referring only
to pregnancy’s “early stages,” wrongly implies that women have no abortion right
during both the second and third trimesters.
144. See Saletan, supra note 135 (discussing post-viability in context of Dr.
Gosnell).
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id.  Some pro-choice scholars would expand Furedi’s argument about
the lack of moral distinctiveness to include the healthy newborn. See generally Al-
berto Giubilini & Francesca Minerva, After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?,
JME ONLINE FIRST (Mar. 2, 2012), http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2012/03/
01/medethics-2011-100411.full.pdftˇml.
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In a subsequent article, Saletan reported the responses to a direct
question he had earlier posed to pro-choicers about the case against Gos-
nell: Should women be permitted to obtain post-viability abortions when
there is no justifying medical reason?148  Saletan published the replies of
six pro-choicers: Two said “no,” i.e., they agree with a prohibition on non-
therapeutic post-viability abortions.149  Four said “yes,” i.e., fetal viability
should impose no constraints on women’s autonomy.150  One explained
that “‘being pro-choice means having the strong belief that women’s bod-
ies should not be used in any way against their will.’”151
It is thus clear that not all pro-choicers accept a cut-off for legal abor-
tion at viability.  Is this a defensible position?  Should advanced fetal life be
so totally subordinated to the will of another person?  Pro-lifers, of course,
say “no,” and thus support the viability line.  An interesting question,
though, is whether this posture is logically consistent with the underlying
presupposition of the pro-life position—that a human life from concep-
tion has moral personhood and is entitled to legal protection.152
Some pro-lifers have lambasted the viability line as morally reprehen-
sible.  For example, University of Georgia law professor Randy Beck
stresses the moral randomness of the concept of viability.153  Viability
makes a fetus’s potential protected status depend upon four morally irrele-
vant variables.154  The first is year of birth.  As medicine has advanced,
fetuses that were not viable at the time of Roe now are.155  The second
factor is geography.156  Viability depends upon the level of medical tech-
nology actually available to a pregnant woman.157  Fetuses in different lo-
148. See William Saletan, The Viability Question: Is It OK to Abort a Viable Fetus?
Six Pro-choice Writers Answer the Question, SLATE (Jan. 27, 2011, 1:06 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2011/01/
the_viability_question.single.html.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. (quoting Pema Levy).
152. For a sophisticated secular argument that moral personhood begins at
conception, see CHRISTOPHER KACZOR, THE ETHICS OF ABORTION: WOMEN’S RIGHTS,
HUMAN LIFE, AND THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE 91-120 (2010).  Kaczor states that his
book addresses the moral permissibility of abortion, not its legality. See id. at 12.
However, his conclusion that “[a]ll human beings, from the zygotic to the geriat-
ric, enjoy the same fundamental rights, including, most fundamentally, the right to
life,” has obvious legal implications. Id. at 120.
153. See Beck, supra note 122, at 257.
154. As noted, viability only creates the possibility of state protection. See
supra note 141 (showing that viable fetus has no independent legal status); infra
note 176 and accompanying text.
155. See Beck, supra note 122, at 257-59.
156. See id. at 259.
157. The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, for example, in defining viabil-
ity, speaks of “the most advanced medical technology and information available to”
the attending physician.  18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (2011).  Justice Scalia indicated
that to him the focus should be on “‘the magical second when machines currently
in use (though not necessarily available to the particular woman) are able to keep
an unborn child alive apart from its mother.’”  Beck, supra note 122, at 259 (quot-
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cales will therefore receive different levels of legal protection.158  As a
woman changes her location during pregnancy, the fetus could thus move
in and out of viability, and therefore in and out of a protected legal sta-
tus.159  The third factor is the discretionary nature of the doctor’s deci-
sion, which can vary with a host of variables, including financial
considerations.160  This financial element is particularly troubling when
one considers that the doctor making the viability determination is usually
an abortion provider who stands to earn a large fee for the procedure.
The fourth factor that demonstrates the indefensibility of the viability line
is that research has shown that race and gender significantly influence the
likelihood of survival outside the womb.161  Female and African-American
fetuses are more likely to survive premature delivery than their male and
Caucasian counterparts.162  This means that female and African-American
fetuses attain viability earlier than males and Caucasians.163  Female fe-
tuses thus obtain protected legal status earlier than male fetuses.  And Afri-
can-American female fetuses receive legal protection earlier than white
female fetuses.  Here is how Professor Beck sums up his critique:
No one drafting a constitution would make the status of an
individual—her eligibility for protection by the state—turn on
the therapeutic techniques available to address an as yet unreal-
ized medical contingency.  Nor would anyone attach controlling
significance to the proximity of cutting edge medical facilities or
to an “imprecise medical judgment” made by a potentially self-
interested physician.  Likewise, one hopes that no one today
would make an individual’s legal status dependent on her race
and gender.  Why should we accept these corollaries of the viabil-
ity rule, which seem inexplicable from a moral perspective?164
Assume that one finds Professor Beck’s moral objections to the viabil-
ity concept persuasive.  Would it then be hypocritical to rely on this mor-
ally indefensible principle to the extent that it offers protection to some
fetuses?  Does depending on the viability line signal that one believes it
ing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 989 n.5 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
158. This assumes, of course, that the particular jurisdictions involved have
enacted protection for viable fetuses.
159. See Beck, supra note 122, at 25.
160. See id. at 260.  Professor Beck lists such factors as “divergent levels of risk-
aversion or conflicting treatment philosophies.” Id.  The “prevailing medical and
socio-cultural attitudes of a particular society” are also influential.  Cohen &
Sayeed, supra note 133, at 236.  In Japan, for example, resuscitation of “neonates
born above 22 weeks by LMP” is more common than in the United States and the
United Kingdom. Id.
161. See Beck, supra note 122, at 260-61.
162. See id. at 260.
163. See id. at 260-61.
164. Id. at 261.
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represents a meaningful moral distinction?165  One answer was offered by
Rev. William S. White, a nineteenth-century pastor, when asked about his
support of temperance campaigns.  He joined the Sons of Temperance,
he said, “not because . . . he thought it the best thing, but because he
believed there was nothing wrong in it, and because if he ‘could not get a
long, straight hickory to kill a snake in his path, he would take any stick he
could find, however crooked.’”166  From the pro-life perspective, the via-
bility line is unpersuasive as a cut-off for according legal protection to
preborn life.  Even pre-viable fetuses should be protected.  But current
constitutional law makes it futile for pro-lifers to seek direct legal protec-
tion for younger fetuses.  This does not make it wrong to take advantage of
the Supreme Court’s willingness to allow a prohibition on post-viability
abortions.167  To give viable fetuses legal protection is only to accord them
the respect they deserve as members of the human family.  Viability is a
significant factor not because pre-viable fetuses are any less deserving of
protection, but because the viable fetus’s ability to live outside the woman
is inescapable, dramatic proof of an underlying physical reality: a fetus is
an individual human life.
Although the foregoing argument provides a satisfactory defense of
pro-life utilization of the viability concept to accord legal protection to
older fetuses, it is not exactly a ringing endorsement of the moral signifi-
cance of the viability line.  Interestingly, and ironically, some pro-choice
165. It can be argued that it is “imprudent” for a pro-lifer to support legal
protection for viable fetuses because doing so “serves to reinforce the legal (court-
imposed) position and the public view that viability has some intrinsic significance
in fetal development.  If viability receives any kind of formal or informal support, it
might be more difficult to remove it from the law when . . . Roe is overturned.”
FORSYTHE, supra note 101, at 156.
166. REV. WILLIAM S. WHITE, REV. WILLIAM S. WHITE, D.D., AND HIS TIMES: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 160 (Rev. H.M. White ed., 1891).
167. Some scholars disagree.  Colin Harte opposes “restrictive abortion legis-
lation,” i.e., laws that “restrict abortion to particular (categories of) unborn chil-
dren—the proposals referring to such things as the gestational age of the unborn
child, . . . etc.” COLIN HARTE, CHANGING UNJUST LAWS JUSTLY: PRO-LIFE SOLIDARITY
WITH “THE LAST AND LEAST” 9 (2005).  Such laws, by allowing some abortion—
here, of pre-viable fetuses—are “intrinsically immoral.” See id. at 15-16, 109.  For
Clarke Forsythe’s extended refutation of Harte’s “moral perfectionism,” see FOR-
SYTHE, supra note 101, at 147-81.  Forsythe emphasizes the examples of William
Wilberforce and Abraham Lincoln, politicians who “erect[ed] legal fences against
a social evil when they could not prohibit it.” Id. at 147; see id. at 78-110 (citing
William Wilberforce’s attempt to prevent social evil); 111-46 (referencing Lin-
coln’s position).  He argues convincingly that:
Building fences around a social evil, as part of a larger strategy to secure
justice, precludes what can be prohibited now without admitting the legit-
imacy of what remains unprohibited.  By limiting the harm done or les-
sening the negative consequences, we do not admit or support the rest of
the evil that we do not have the power (legal or political) to touch now.
Id. at 250; see id. at 160, 181 (discussing positives of lessening consequences by
limiting harm); Calhoun, supra note 120, at 819-21.  For the argument that this
fence-building strategy cannot be appropriately implemented via excessive abor-
tion clinic safety regulations, see supra note 101.
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advocates have supplied more enthusiastic, if indirect, support.  Frances
Kissling states that “[v]ery few people would argue that there is no differ-
ence between the decision to abort at 6 weeks and the decision to do so
when the fetus would be viable outside of the womb.”168  But Kissling does
not explain this difference and thus does not really answer Ann Furedi’s
contention that there is nothing morally distinctive about the viable fe-
tus.169  Other pro-choice writers, in defending post-viability protection for
fetuses, disagree with Furedi.  They focus not on viability per se—i.e.,
survivability—but on aspects of fetal development that coincide with viabil-
ity.  Carl Sagan emphasized that “the earliest onset of human thinking”
occurs at six months gestation.170  This fact justifies prohibiting abortion
in the third trimester,171 the point at which the Supreme Court coinciden-
tally drew the viability line.172  Ronald Dworkin supports the viability line
because it coincides with brain development that allows “a primitive form
of fetal sentience”173—i.e., the ability to feel pain.174
168. Kissling, supra note 7.
169. See supra text accompanying note 147.  For another example of a pro-
choicer (at the time of expressing the following viewpoint) who opposed post-via-
bility abortions without a fully articulated rationale, see JOHNSON, supra note 50, at
97 (arguing that, after viability, fetus “is a baby”).
170. Carl Sagan & Ann Druyan, Is It Possible to Be Pro-life and Pro-choice?, PARADE
MAG., Apr. 22, 1990, at 7.
171. See id. at 8 (stating that third-trimester abortion should be allowed only
“in cases of grave medical necessity”).
172. See id. at 7-8.  Gregg Easterbrook also emphasizes fetal brain develop-
ment as the principal factor legitimizing abortion prohibition.  He asserts that new
fetal science shows that “complex fetal brain activity” begins “at the start of the
third trimester.”  Gregg Easterbrook, Abortion and Brain Waves: What Neither Side
Wants You To Know, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 2000, at 21, 25.  Although this brain
development milestone occurs “at about the time when life outside the mother
becomes possible,” Easterbrook argues that “[t]he hopelessly confusing viability
standard should be dropped in favor of a bright line drawn at the start of the third
trimester.” Id. at 23, 25.  Abortion after this point is “morally odious” and “should
be very tightly restricted.” Id. at 25.  David Boonin agrees that fetal brain develop-
ment (“organized cortical brain activity”) should be the governing criterion for a
right to life, but argues that this comes well after the point of viability. See DAVID
BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION 115-16, 129 (2003).
173. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 169 (1993).
174. See id. at 16-17.  Dworkin believes that because “‘we should use extreme
caution in respecting and protecting possible sentience, a provisional boundary at
about twenty-six weeks should provide safety against reasonable concerns.  This
time is coincident with the present definition of viability.’” Id. at 17 (quoting
“leading embryologist” expert).  This passage suggests that should fetal viability be
pushed earlier in the pregnancy, before sentience is possible, Dworkin would aban-
don viability as a significant line in favor of sentience per se.  It should be noted,
though, that recent developments demonstrate that fetal sentience may begin
prior to twenty-six weeks.  Several states have recently passed pain-capable unborn
child protection acts, which generally prohibit abortion after twenty-weeks post-
fertilization age (twenty-two weeks by LMP, see supra note 138), based on evidence
of various kinds that unborn children can experience pain at this stage of develop-
ment. See, e.g, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-3,102 to -3,111 (Supp. 2010); NEB. REV. STAT.
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Assuming that viable fetuses deserve legal protection,175 it is problem-
atic that in some states such protection is completely lacking.176  Moreo-
ver, how effective are the laws that have been enacted?177  What is done to
ensure that viable fetuses are identified?178  And what about the required
§ 28-3,104 (describing legislative findings of substantial medical evidence indicat-
ing that unborn children can feel pain).  The view that fetuses can feel pain at this
age is highly contested.  The principal argument is that pain perception is impossi-
ble without a cerebral cortex, which does not develop “before 24 weeks of gesta-
tion.” See Erik Eckholm, New Laws in 6 States Ban Abortions After 20 Weeks, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2011, at A10.  The necessity of a cortex, however, is called into
serious question by a study documenting that a twenty-three week-old fetus, follow-
ing an abdominal needle injection, showed increased bloodstream concentrations
of substances indicative of pain. See David Brown, Late Term Abortions; Who Gets
Them and Why, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1996, at Z12.  Even if twenty-week fetuses do
experience pain while being aborted, it is questionable whether the new statutes
are constitutional under present law.  The Supreme Court has consistently held
that states may only generally prohibit abortion after fetal viability. See supra note
138.  The constitutional issue is unresolved, but two scholars argue that such laws
are invalid, although “the question is closer than defenders of the abortion right
might like.”  Cohen & Sayeed, supra note 133, at 241.  Cynthia Gorney would likely
say that the underlying purpose of such laws is not principally to prohibit certain
abortions, but rather, like partial-birth abortion bans, to “force people to keep
picturing what actually takes place in an abortion-procedure room.”  Gorney, supra
note 132, at 36.  Emphasizing fetal pain is but another step in right-to-lifers’ “force-
the-visuals campaign, which has all the explosive public relations potential of its
predecessor [partial-birth abortion bans].” Id. at 46.  Gorney believes that the
same right-to-life strategy is reflected in measures requiring that fetal ultrasounds
be made available or shown to women contemplating an abortion. See supra note
52.  This is one more “way to force people to look literally, as well as emotionally,
at what the act [of abortion] involves.” Cynthia Gorney: Parsing the Politics of Abortion,
supra note 125.
175. To say that the viability line supports protection for viable fetuses does
not, from the pro-life perspective, suggest that pre-viable fetuses are not entitled to
protection. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67.
176. Approximately ten states have no statutory prohibition of late abortions.
See State Policies on Later-Term Abortions, ST. POLICIES IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst.,
New York, N.Y.) Feb. 1, 2012, at 2, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf.
177. In an insightful essay, Patrick J. Flood argues that a statutory scheme
must have four elements to confer meaningful protection on viable fetuses: (1)
mandatory viability testing; (2) required independent confirmation of viability; (3)
an exception permitting post-viability abortions only for maternal physical health
concerns; and (4) required independent confirmation of the exception’s applica-
bility. See Patrick J. Flood, Mandatory Viability Testing and Post-viability Abortion Re-
striction: The Best Way Forward in the Immediate Future?, in LIFE AND LEARNING XI:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE 111, 112-
13 (Joseph W. Koterski ed., 2002).  Although these measures would undoubtedly
confer substantial protection on viable fetuses, they arguably do not go far enough.
The context here is a contemplated private killing of a human being that the Su-
preme Court has said can be protected by the state.  If one is truly serious about
according this protection, why not require that a guardian ad litem be appointed
for any fetus within the range of possible viability?  Give the fetus an advocate to
evaluate on its behalf whether Flood’s four elements have been satisfied.
178. Although some states require viability testing, states generally “do not
require a confirming second opinion from a qualified independent physician.
Since the first opinion is usually going to come from the abortionist, who has an
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exception allowing abortions to protect the life and health of the
mother?179  Pro-lifers have long contended that this requirement makes
viability protection meaningless.180  This concern is based on Doe v. Bol-
ton,181 the companion case to Roe v. Wade.182 Doe, in speaking to the
meaning of “health,” stated that the concept included “all factors—physi-
cal, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to
the well-being of the patient.”183  In commenting on this language in Doe,
journalism professor Cynthia Gorney of the University of California at
Berkeley says it means that a state cannot interfere if a doctor concludes
the woman needs the abortion, “no matter how advanced her pregnancy
is.”184  Gorney illustrates this point with a hypothetical that appears peri-
odically in the abortion debate:
interest in performing the abortion, there could be reason to lack confidence in
the assessment.  An independent second opinion is crucial.” Id. at 112.  As noted,
Pennsylvania lacks a second-opinion requirement for its equivalent of viability test-
ing—determining the unborn child’s probable gestational age. See supra note 138
(discussing Pennsylvania law on viability testing).  Pennsylvania also precludes lia-
bility for any physician who aborts an unborn child beyond the twenty-four-week
statutory limit if the doctor reasonably believed, after conducting the required age
testing, that the child was younger than that age. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3211(b)(2) (1998).
179. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
180. See Stephen G. Gilles, Roe’s Life-or-Health Exception: Self-Defense or Relative-
Safety?, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 525, 554-55, 555 n.135 (2010).
181. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
182. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
183. Doe, 410 U.S. at 192.  The Doe Court, in discussing the meaning of
“health,” was not referring to the scope of the required maternal life and health
exceptions to any post-viability abortion prohibition, but rather was rejecting a
vagueness challenge to a Georgia statute allowing abortion only when necessary in
the medical judgment of the attending physician. See id. at 191-92.  Consequently,
some argue that it is incorrect to import Doe’s expansive conception of health into
Roe’s formulation of when abortion may be prohibited post-viability. See, e.g.,
Gilles, supra note 180, at 554-58; Michael J. Tierney, Note, Post-viability Abortion
Bans and the Limits of the Health Exception, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 465, 470-71
(2004).  Other scholars argue that Roe must be read in light of Doe. See, e.g., LIN-
TON, supra note 85, at 3 n.3 (citing lower court endorsement of this interpreta-
tion); Glendon, supra note 143, at 5, 6; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst
Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 995 n.4, 1022, 1039
n.113 (2003).  According to Matthew Franck, Doe’s “broad language resulted, in
practice, in the total elimination of the state’s power to prohibit post-viability abor-
tions, not just a narrow exception to that power.”  Matthew J. Franck, The Gosnell
Case and American Abortion Law, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, (Feb. 3, 2011, 4:00 AM), http:/
/www.nationalreview.com/articles/258707/gosnell-case-and-american-abortion-
law-matthew-j-franck.
184. Gorney, supra note 132, at 39.  This standard is correctly summarized by
abortion opponents as “ ‘legal at any time, for any reason, all the way through the
ninth month of pregnancy.’” Id.  Other journalists agree with this assessment of
Doe. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 174; Roy Rivenburg, Partial Truths, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
2, 1997, at 1.  For a discussion of whether the Supreme Court would still require
such an unlimited health exception, see infra note 194 and accompanying text. R
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From time to time, for rhetorical purposes, the prom-dress girl is
invoked—a fictional teenager who has suddenly decided she’s
too pregnant for her formal and walks into a clinic at twenty-
eight weeks demanding to have it taken care of.  Nobody has ever
produced an actual prom-dress girl; the point about the prom-
dress girl is theoretical, and in a theoretical way it is true: under
Roe, and under Casey, in the unlikely event that the prom-dress
girl were able to find a suitably cooperative doctor, she too would
theoretically be able to claim a legal right to abortion—a consti-
tutionally protected “right to choose.”185
Let this sink in for a moment.  The law in the United States, as it
stands right now, is that a woman who is well into her third trimester or
even on the verge of a full-term delivery, can obtain a legal abortion if she
decides she wants to look better in a prom dress.186  All she must do is find
an abortion provider who is willing to do the procedure and willing to say
it is necessary because of concerns about her emotional well-being.187  It is
important to note that Professor Gorney is not an advocate on the abor-
185. Gorney, supra note 132, at 40.  An interesting exchange on the prom-
dress hypothetical took place during the 1997 debates on the Federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act.  The NAF’s Vicki Saporta decried as insulting to women a pro-
life ad using the prom-dress scenario to illustrate the breadth of the health excep-
tion. Partial-Birth Abortion—The Truth: Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary and the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
88 (1997).  Helen Alvare, representing the National Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops, responded that pro-choicers were “incredibly furious about that ad,” indeed,
it “was their nightmare because it laid out for the public . . . as clear as one could
get, the possible breadth of a health exception.” Id. at 88-89.
186. Some pro-choicers either do not grasp or resist acknowledging this real-
ity.  President Bill Clinton, for example, in arguing that any partial-birth abortion
ban should have a health exception, stated that exception opponents responded:
“[W]ell, if we have a health exception you know you could—the doctor
and the mother could say anything—they can’t fit in their prom dress,
that’s a health exception—some terrible things like that.”
And I said, “No, no, no, I will accept language that says serious ad-
verse health consequences to the mother—those three words.  Everyone
in the world will know what we’re talking about.”
President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Vetoing Partial Birth Abortion Legislation,
1996 PUB. PAPERS 565, 566, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-
book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg565.pdf.  Former NARAL head Kate Michel-
man has “denounced the prom [dress scenario] as a lie.”  Rivenburg, supra note
184.  Pro-lifers, however, claim not that the prom-dress situation has actually
arisen, but only that it accurately conveys the state of the law.  As pro-life professor
Helen Alvare once expressed it, “[t]he idea was to shock people into realizing how
loose a ‘health exception’ would be.” Id.; see Glendon, supra note 143, at 6
(“[M]ost people . . . have great difficulty wrapping their minds around the idea
that the Court would permit the intentional destruction of a healthy infant who
was capable of living outside his or her mother’s body, when the mother’s health
(in the ordinary meaning of that word) is not in serious danger.”).
187. See Paulsen, supra note 183, at 996 n.4.
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tion issue.188  But she is troubled by late-term abortions, and wonders
about the mile-wide “health” exception to the viability line.  If, she says,
viability is the point at which the abortion decision should no longer be
strictly between a woman and her doctor, “is it sensible or is it evasive to
maintain the post-viability catch-all of ‘all factors’ health?”189
Pro-lifers would of course be glad to narrow the health exception, but
would pro-choicers go along?190  Here, it is significant to note that the
188. What the Economist said in 1998 is still true today: Professor Gorney “is an
even-handed reporter who does not let her guard slip: her own opinion on abor-
tion remains unknown.” Unwanted Pregnancies: What to Do?, Article in Review of
Books and Multimedia, ECONOMIST, May 14, 1998, at 12 (reviewing CYNTHIA GORNEY,
ARTICLES OF FAITH: A FRONTLINE HISTORY OF THE ABORTION WARS (1998)).
189. Gorney, supra note 132, at 46.  Although Professor Gorney suggests that
the health exception may be too broad—and thus that the post-viability abortion
right might be too extensive—she has other concerns that, if addressed via law,
would broaden the freedom to abort post-viability.  Some, but certainly not all, late
abortions occur due to fetal deformity. See Brown, supra note 174.  Professor Gor-
ney struggles with whether post-viability abortions should be allowed in such in-
stances.  In 1998, she stated what appears to be a definite opinion.  Late-term
abortions are “‘awful.  Everybody thinks so.  They make you sick.  Nobody thinks it
should be okay to do this if your kid does not have some fetal deformity.’”  Orrick,
supra note 14, at 12.  In 2004, however, she expressed herself more tentatively by
simply posing the question of whether it would be “right or wrong to differentiate”
among rationales for a late abortion—e.g., a “woman whose life is a disaster” versus
“the woman who doesn’t receive the Down syndrome diagnosis until after she has
picked out the baby’s name.”  Gorney, supra note 132, at 46.  Even though Gor-
ney’s ultimate position is unclear, present law gives states the power to ban post-
viability abortions with only two mandatory exceptions: for the life and health of
the mother. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. A separate fetal deformity
exception is not required.  If the health exception is significantly narrowed—a re-
sult Professor Gorney seems to support—the change would likely eliminate the
argument that fetal deformity abortions must be allowed to protect the woman’s
emotional or psychological health.  A state could therefore freely prohibit post-
viability fetal deformity abortions unless a court stretched the required life of the
mother exception to cover such situations.  Although it is questionable whether
any fetal deformity, however severe, could rightly be viewed as jeopardizing the
woman’s life (unless the threat of maternal suicide is viewed as satisfying this re-
quirement), it presumably would be preposterous to consider some of the fetal
defects cited as justifying late abortions—e.g., cleft lip—as satisfying this criterion.
See Brown, supra note 174.  None of the above, of course, would prevent a state
from allowing post-viability fetal deformity abortions by making such an exception
explicit.  States considering this step would presumably have to engage the ques-
tion of what conditions, if any, are severe enough to justify such a late abortion.
Would Down syndrome suffice?  What signal would sanctioning abortions for such
fetuses send to the Down syndrome community?  States hopefully would also take
into account the correctability of fetal defects, however severe.  A recent study, for
example, has shown that surgery in utero has clear benefits in treating spina bifida,
a spinal column defect that has been relied upon to justify late abortions. See
Brown, supra note 174.  “[B]abies who have the operation in the womb were more
likely to walk without help and less likely to need a tube to drain fluid buildup in
the brain.” Study Supports Surgery in Utero, ROANOKE TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at 8.
States hopefully will reject any effort to give pregnant women the discretion to kill
viable babies with treatable medical conditions.
190. There is some evidence of pro-choice flexibility.  As noted, President
Clinton supports an exception requiring “serious adverse health consequences.”
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health exception in the Pennsylvania viability statute is much more limited
than the broad exception contemplated by Roe.191  Pennsylvania law per-
mits post-viability abortions that a physician believes are “necessary to pre-
vent either the death of the pregnant woman or the substantial and
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the woman.”192  Is
this a narrowing of the abortion right that pro-choicers could live with?193
Even if so, it is questionable whether the Pennsylvania approach could
survive a constitutional challenge.194
Clinton, supra note 186, at 566.  Frances Kissling believes that post-viability abor-
tions should be rejected “except in extreme cases,” including “when the woman’s
health is seriously threatened by a medical or psychological condition that contin-
ued pregnancy will exacerbate.”  Kissling, supra note 7.  This statement covers
mental health, but requires a risk to the woman greater than a reduction in her
“well-being.”  Some pro-choicers have gone further to support elimination of
mental health considerations altogether.  In 1998, for example, “ten pro-choice
U.S. Senators . . . introduced a bill to ban all abortions after viability unless ‘contin-
uation of the pregnancy would threaten the mother’s life or risk grievous injury to
her physical health.’”  Flood, supra note 177, at 123.  But even if pro-choice sup-
port for tightening the health exception was universal, any such change would
obviously be unavailing were it found to be unconstitutional. See infra note 194.
191. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
192. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3211(b)(1) (1998).  There is evidence that this
tight exception, stricter than in most other states, “was written precisely in order to
bring about a confrontation with the on-demand abortion regime the Court cre-
ated in Doe.”  Franck, supra note 183; see State Policies on Later-Term Abortions, supra
note 176.  Although this language is much narrower than what Doe contemplates,
to the pro-lifer Pennsylvania’s exception still has significant flaws.  Its second-opin-
ion requirement refers to “one other licensed physician,” language broad enough
to mean another abortion provider, including even someone in a business rela-
tionship with the performing physician. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3211(c)(2).  The
law therefore lacks the critical prerequisite of a second opinion from a disinter-
ested party. See supra notes 177-78.  Moreover, failure to obtain a second opinion
does not make a physician culpable of the substantive felony offense of performing
an abortion at or beyond twenty-four weeks gestational age.  It is instead treated as
a separate crime punishable as a misdemeanor. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3211(d).
The performing physician can escape a felony charge based on his or her own
reasonable belief that the abortion was necessary to avoid the described physical
harm to the woman. See id. § 3211(b)(1).
193. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (describing potential pro-
choice flexibility).
194. This issue includes a state constitutional dimension, but the emphasis
here will be on the Federal Constitution. See supra note 85.  Although Penn-
sylvania’s narrow exception is plainly incompatible with Roe and Doe, see supra notes
181-83 and accompanying text, might it survive scrutiny under Casey’s undue bur-
den standard? See supra note 85.  Does the Constitution as now interpreted require
that the health exception to any post-viability abortion prohibition cover both
mental and physical health? Casey did approve a Pennsylvania medical emergency
provision that does not mention mental health, but refers only to physical health
using the exact language of its post-viability statute. See Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879-80 (1992) (plurality opinion).  This law, however,
did not pertain to post-viability abortions, but rather was an exception to various
other requirements of Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act, such as informed and
parental consent. See id. at 879, 881, 899.  Moreover, the Court elsewhere states,
also in a context not pertaining to viability, that “[i]t cannot be questioned that
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A brief, final point is necessary.  One alleged negative consequence of
meaningful constitutional legal protection for viable fetuses is that “[i]f
late-term abortions are outlawed, only outlaws will do late-term abor-
tions.”195  William Saletan provides a convincing rebuttal:
It’s true that abortion laws make back-alley butchers like Gosnell
more likely.  But the same argument has been made about fe-
male genital mutilation: if you don’t let parents obtain it legally,
they’ll go to unlicensed underground practitioners.  Is there
some point at which a decent society must simply forbid a prac-
tice?  If killing a viable fetus—a baby that no longer needs a
womb to survive—isn’t such a practice, what is?196
V. CONCLUSION
One commentator has written that after “abortion doctor Kermit Gos-
nell and his clinic—run so poorly that Gosnell has been charged with mur-
dering seven babies and one woman—everyone could agree on one thing:
Such tragedy should never happen again.”197  Another states that
psychological well-being is a facet of health.” Id. at 882. Casey therefore provides
no clear answer.  Nor does the Supreme Court’s most recent abortion decision,
Gonzales v. Carhart, which upheld the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. See
generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  That decision dealt with abor-
tion methods, not post-viability abortions.  Moreover, in holding that “the ‘signifi-
cant health risks’ test is the current legal standard to which restrictions on
abortion methods must conform,” the Court “sidestepped the question of its legal
meaning.”  Gilles, supra note 180, at 611.  The decision most directly on point is
Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, in which the Sixth Circuit held that,
despite Casey, Doe’s view that health includes mental health applies to post-viability
health exceptions.  Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 208-10
(6th Cir. 1997).  The court, however, did not mean health in the broadest sense of
well-being.  Its holding was “that a maternal health exception must encompass se-
vere irreversible risks of mental and emotional harm.” Id. at 209.  The Supreme
Court denied certiorari, but three Justices dissented, arguing “that Doe was not
controlling, and that whether state postviability bans were required to include ex-
plicit mental health exceptions was an important and unresolved question the
Court should address.”  Gilles, supra note 180, at 562.  The issue “has remained in
this somewhat unsettled posture ever since.” Id.  Also unresolved is the underlying
philosophy of the health exception.  Is it to be applied “in accordance with self-
defense principles, on the theory that the state’s interest in viable fetal life should
yield to the woman’s right to self-preservation”? Id. at 527.  Or, instead, should
relative safety be the governing concept, under which “the state’s interest in viable
fetal life . . . must yield when, in addition, continued pregnancy would pose greater
risks to her life or health than an abortion”? Id.  Professor Gilles, after “a thorough
and rigorous descriptive analysis of the Court’s decisions,” concludes by criticizing
the Court for failing in its duty to state what the law is on this important question.
Id. at 529, 620.
195. Saletan, supra note 140.
196. Id.  The challenge to the most zealous pro-choice advocates is thus clear.
“Do they continue to agitate for the regime of abortion on demand that they’ve
been defending for 38 years?  [Or d]o they fold this particular hand, and concede
that some abortions occur too late to be permitted at all?”  Franck, supra note 183.
197. Otterbein, supra note 41.
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“[p]eople on both sides of the abortion debate should have been outraged
by what was happening.  Such atrocities should rise above ideology, ap-
pealing to basic humanity.”198
This Article has focused on three of Dr. Gosnell’s atrocities: his
shameful, destructive treatment of women; his brutal killing of born-alive
infants; and his performance of illegal post-viability abortions.  Pro-
choicers and pro-lifers alike should unite in condemning, stopping, and
preventing these abuses.  Women seeking abortions need the protection
of medically appropriate health and safety regulations;199 a civilized soci-
ety should not tolerate the killing of babies, viable or not, once they are
born; and viable fetuses deserve meaningful legal protection.  The wider
abortion controversy is sure to continue, but the combatants should join
forces to achieve these three significant objectives.
198. Heller, supra note 1.
199. Conflicting views of what requirements are “medically appropriate” will
no doubt continue to complicate any regulatory efforts. See supra note 41 (describ-
ing disagreement over Pennsylvania’s recently enacted clinic regulations).  This
Article urges both sides in the larger abortion controversy to exercise the utmost
good faith in interacting on this contentious issue.
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